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I
INTRODUCTION
In the introductory essay to this symposium, I define probable cause as
having four components: one quantitative (How certain must the police be?),
one qualitative (How strong must the supporting data sources be?), one
temporal (When must police and courts make their judgments?), and one moral
(Do the police have “individualized suspicion”1?).2 My focus in this article is on
the last of these components. “Individualized suspicion,” the United States
Supreme Court has suggested, is perhaps the most important of the four
components of probable cause.3 That is a position with which I heartily agree.
The other three components each play only a supporting role. But
individualized suspicion is the beating heart that gives probable cause its
vitality.4
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1. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) (“[I]ndividualized suspicion is
usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure.”).
2. See Andrew E. Tasltiz, Foreword, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i, i–ii (Summer 2010).
3. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 37273 (2003) (“‘The substance of all the definitions of
probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,’ and that the belief of guilt must be
particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized.”) (quoting McCarthy v. De Armit, 99
Pa. 63, 69 (1881), and citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 445 U.S. 85 (1979)).
4. See Tracy Maclin, The Pringle Case’s New Notion of Probable Cause: An Assault on Di Re and
the Fourth Amendment, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 395, 41012 (summarizing the history of the
individualized-suspicion requirement); id. at 411 (“It is a fair summary of the history of the Fourth
Amendment to say that the provision reflected the Framers’ desire to control the discretion of ordinary
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Roughly defined, individualized suspicion is the idea that the state should
judge each citizen based upon his own unique actions, character, thoughts, and
situation.5 The state should not base its judgments on stereotypes, assumptions,
guilt-by-association, or other generalities.6 As central as individualized suspicion
is to defining probable cause, however, such suspicion also plays a role in
cognate concepts, primarily “reasonable suspicion.”7 Accordingly, fully
understanding individualized suspicion requires examining both probable cause
and its junior partner, reasonable suspicion. That partner is generally defined as
a sort of “probable cause light,” resting on a lower level of certainty and weaker
data sources than probable cause, but otherwise retaining its core commitment
to individualized treatment.8 Understanding the Court’s approach to such
matters sets the stage for the conceptual discussion that follows.
A. Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding
1. The Tip Behind a Strip Search
One recent example of the Court’s giving serious weight to a commitment to
individualized suspicion, even under the less-muscular reasonable-suspicion
standard, is Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding.9 There, a middle
school’s policies prohibited students possessing, while in school, any
prescription or over-the-counter drugsincluding ibuprofenwithout prior

law enforcement officers and to eliminate governmental intrusions lacking particularized suspicion.”)
(emphasis added). See also ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A
HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 17891868 258–59 (2006) (summarizing history’s teachings
concerning the individualized-suspicion requirement).
5. Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice through Psychological Character
Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 330 (1993) (explaining the social-science and philosophical literature
defining the “individualized justice” principle in substantive and evidentiary criminal lawa principle
conceptually indistinguishable from the “individualized suspicion” aspect of probable cause).
6. See TASLITZ, supra note 4, at 25859 (making a similar point); Maclin, supra note 4, at 395
(“Americans have rightly believed that an individual should not be judged solely on the basis of the
company that he keeps. Fourth Amendment law has embraced a similar norm.”).
7. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), first articulated the “reasonable suspicion” standard and
described the standard as to frisks as involving an officer’s having “reason to believe that he is dealing
with an armed and dangerous individual” (emphasis added). Terry noted as well that “due weight must
be given, not to [the officer’s] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Id.
8. In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990), the Court explained, reasonable suspicion is a
less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be
established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish
probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less
reliable than that required to show probable cause. See also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7
(1989) (remarking that the level of suspicion for reasonable suspicion “is considerably less than proof of
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence” and less than a “fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found”“fair probability” being the definition of the quantum of evidence
necessary to proving probable cause); C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta
of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1325 (1982) (summarizing a survey
of federal judges quantifying reasonable suspicion as an average certainty of thirty-one percent).
9. 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
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permission. That policy was triggered when a male student told Assistant
Principal Kerry Wilson that “certain students were bringing drugs and weapons
on campus.”10 The student also said that he had gotten sick after taking some
pills that “he got from a classmate.”11 That boy later gave Wilson a white pill,
claiming that he had gotten it from Marissa Glines. The student nurse identified
the pill as prescription-strength ibuprofen. Wilson pulled Marissa from her class
and showed her a day planner that her teacher had found within Marissa’s reach
that contained, among other things, knives and a cigarette. Wilson asked
Marissa to empty her pockets and to show the contents of her wallet, which she
did. Her doing so revealed two pills—one blue, one white—and a razor blade.
Marissa insisted that she had gotten the ibuprofen from thirteen-year-old
Savana Redding but denied knowing anything about the day planner’s contents.
Wilson then ordered the school nurse and an administrative assistant to conduct
a body search of Marissa. That search included examining her bra and panties,
which revealed no further pills.
A week later, Wilson called Savana Redding into his office, where she
admitted to owning the day planner but said that “she had lent it to Marissa.”12
Savana denied knowing anything about the contraband it had contained. Wilson
had learned from other staff members that Savana and Marissa were friends
and had been “part of an unusually rowdy group at the school’s opening dance
in August, during which alcohol and cigarettes were found in the girls’
bathroom.”13 He and his administrative assistant, Helen Romero, consequently
searched Savana’s backpack, with Savana’s consent, to no avail.14
At Wilson’s instruction, Romero and the school nurse asked Savana to
remove all her clothes down to her bra and panties; Savana complied. Savana
again complied when instructed to “pull her bra out and to the side,” to shake
it, and to pull out her underpants’ elastic, “thus exposing her breasts and pelvic
area to some degree.”15
Savana’s mother filed suit against the school district, Wilson, Romero, and
the school nurse for violating Savana’s Fourth Amendment rights by conducting
a strip search. The District Court for the District of Arizona found the claim
meritless, granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.16

10. Id. at 2640.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2641.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2638.
15. Id.
16. A Ninth Circuit panel affirmed. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 504 F.3d 828 (9th
Cir. 2007). But sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding a Fourth Amendment violation
under law “clearly established” at the time, thus denying qualified immunity and reversing summary
judgment as to Wilson, though upholding summary judgment as to other defendants on other grounds.
Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
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2. The Role of Humiliation in Defining the Relevant “Reasonable
Suspicion”
The United States Supreme Court found a violation of Savana’s Fourth
Amendment rights. The Court relied specifically on its probable-cause
jurisprudence, at least concerning how reliable, credible, and specific the
information upon which the state relied had to be to establish the necessary
individualized suspicion.17 The Court did note, however, that probable cause
requires sufficient proof of a “substantial chance” of discovering evidence of
criminality, while the lesser school-searches standard of reasonable suspicion
“could as readily be described as a moderate chance of finding evidence of
wrongdoing.”18
The Court determined whether this standard had been met by dividing the
search into two stages: first, the search of Savana’s backpack, outer clothing,
and bag; second, the “strip search of Savana.”19 The Court created this
dichotomy because the humiliating nature of the strip search, especially given
Savana’s age, was far more intrusive than that of the backpack and related
searches, thus requiring separate justification, including separate individualized
suspicion to believe that contraband was not simply on her person or property
but in her underwear. Indeed, the Court readily found reasonable suspicion for
Wilson’s believing that Savana may have had contraband on her person or in
her backpack or outer clothing. But the Court found suspicion inadequate to
believe either that the contraband posed a serious danger to the students (after
all, only small quantities of ibuprofen and related common pain relievers were
involved) or “that Savanna was carrying pills in her underwear.”20 As to the
latter, the Court carefully distinguished among generalizations about what sorts
of students might possess the pills versus specific reasons, rooted in trustworthy
evidence, to believe that this student, Savana—and not anyone else—had them
in her underwear.21
3. The Inadequacy of Generalizations
The defendants had argued, as a “truth universally acknowledged,” that
students often hide contraband in their clothing, including in their underwear,
citing several examples of the latter.22 However, said the Court, the extreme
intrusiveness of adolescent strip searches “requires some justification in
[specific] suspected facts,” so “general background possibilities fall short . . . .”23
Accordingly, a “reasonable search that extensive calls for [individualized]

17. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2641 (“The exact label for this final step in the intrusion is not important, though strip
search is a fair way to speak of it.”).
20. Id. at 2643 (emphasis added).
21. See id. at 264344.
22. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642 (2009).
23. Id.
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suspicion that it will pay off.”24 Yet the record included no evidence of the
alleged general practice in the Safford Middle School of hiding contraband in
underwear.25 More importantly, explained the Court, “neither [the male student
tipster] nor Marissa [had] suggested to Wilson that Savana was [hiding
contraband in her underwear], and the preceding search of Marissa that Wilson
[had] ordered [had] yielded nothing.”26 Nor did the nondangerous type of
contraband suspected raise the “specter of stashes in intimate places . . . .”27
Furthermore, noted the Court, Wilson had failed to conduct the sort of
additional investigation that might have linked the evidence he already had to
Savana’s underwear. For example, Wilson had never asked Marissa when she
had purportedly received the pills from Savana. Had they been received days
before, that would have counted against reasonable suspicion that Savana
currently had them on her person, “much less in her underwear.”28 Nor had
Wilson asked Marissa where Savana might be hiding the pills.
The Court clearly considered, however, the presence, absence, or nature of
a variety of generalizations relevant to its inquiry. But it questioned whether
there was hard evidence to support such generalizations. Even more critical to
its holding was that generalizations were not enough; there had to be additional
case-specific facts that, when combined with the supportable generalizations,
established reasonable suspicion to believe that this suspect, at this time, hid
contraband in the specific location of her underwear. Moreover, that
underwear-specific suspicion had to be based primarily on her own actions,
mental state, and personal history.29 Furthermore, although the Court found the
intrusiveness of the strip search to be a “quantum leap”30 above that of the
backpack and related searches, it did so primarily to justify its two-stage
division of the searches. It did not rely on the intrusiveness of the search alone
as its rationale. Indeed, having made this division, the Court described its
remaining conclusions as turning on the combination of the nondangerous
nature of the contraband and the lack of adequate individualized evidence that
the contraband was then in Savana’s underwear:
[W]hat was missing from the suspected facts that pointed to Savana was any indication
of danger to the students from the power of the drugs or their quantity, and any
reason to suppose that Savana was carrying pills in her underwear. We think that the
31
combination of these deficiencies was fatal to finding the search reasonable.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra II.A (defining “individualized suspicion”).
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643 (2009).
Id. at 2642–43 (emphasis added).
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Moreover, despite the particularly intrusive nature of the strip search,32 the
Court has applied a similarly vigorous approach to individualized suspicion in
several other less-troubling circumstances.33 Redding would also suggest that the
Court is likely to even more aggressively defend the individualized-suspicion
requirement in probable-cause cases because reasonable suspicion is a lesser
standard than probable cause. Likewise, the Court might be more aggressive in
contexts other than that of the middle-school, in which courts pay a “high
degree of deference” to the “educator’s professional judgment.”34 Redding
might thus be seen as an exemplar of the Court’s zealous commitment to the
individualized-suspicion ideal.
B. Cutting Samson’s Hair: The Lapsed Commitment to Individualized Justice
Nevertheless, such a judgment would be flatly wrong. The Court itself has
often readily dispensed entirely with an individualized-suspicion mandate. At
first, it did this largely in “special needs” or “administrative search” cases, those
whose “primary objective programmatic purpose” was other than criminal
investigation.35 Examples include random drug testing for individuals in safetysensitive jobs, health and safety inspections, and inventory searches.36 Next, it
expanded these “special needs” searches and seizures to contexts that would
seem to the layperson to be at least partly criminal investigation but that the
Court insisted “primarily” involved other purposes. These searches and seizures
included drunk-driving roadblocks, searches of automobile junkyards for stolen
property, and even searches of probationers and parolees for contraband (likely
resulting in revocation of their probation or parole and prosecution for a new

32. The Court did suggest at several points that its relatively vigorous examination of evidence of
individualized suspicion that contraband was in Savana’s underwear might be attributed to the highly
intrusive nature of the strip search. For example, “[W]hen the categorically extreme intrusiveness of a
search down to the body of an adolescent requires some justifications in suspected facts, general
background possibilities of criminal conduct fall short . . . .” Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642 (emphasis
added). This statement might be read as meaning that when searches of young students are not by
definition extremely intrusive, mere “general background possibilities”what I have here called
“generalizations”might be sufficient. See id. (“Here, the content of the suspicion failed to match the
degree of the intrusion.”).
33. See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1987) (requiring reasonable suspicion that
knocking and announcing police presence before executing a warrant would be futile or dangerous, or
that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime).
34. See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643.
35. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, MARGARET L. PARIS & LENESE HERBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 400–18 (3d ed. 2007) (defining “special needs” and “administrative” searches).
Though the definition of “primary objective programmatic purpose” is unclear, and the details of the
debate not worth pursuing here, see Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment?: Consent,
Care, Privacy, and Social Meaning in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1
(2002), for a stab at its definition.
36. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 40205, 40818, 44248 (summarizing case
law). The Court has also found one seizurebriefly stopping cars to see if anyone had witnessed a
recent hit-and-runto be administrative, even though its objective was to investigate crime, because
the persons stopped were not those suspected of that crime. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
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offense) or evidence of other crimes.37 The Court has also eliminated any
individualized-suspicion requirement for some clear criminal searches, such as
searches incident to arrest and consent searches,38 and has repeatedly expanded
the arguably watered-down version of individualized suspicion, namely
reasonable suspicion, from its roots in Terry v. Ohio “stop-and-frisks”39 to a
wide range of other contexts.40
Throughout its frequent jettisoning of an individualized-suspicion mandate,
the Court has nevertheless often suggested that it has done so only in a few,
relatively narrow “exceptions” to an otherwise controlling individualizedsuspicion presumption.41 Recently, however, it has more candidly rejected, or at
least diluted, any such presumption. Thus, in Samson v. California,42 an officer
searched the person of someone the officer recognized as a parolee. The officer
admitted that he entirely lacked any individualized suspicion, but he searched
simply because he saw subjection to suspicionless searches for evidence of crime
as a condition of parole. The Court upheld the search, though it was clearly
done for the purposes of criminal investigation. Justice Thomas, writing for the
Court, declared,
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not individualized
suspicion. Thus, while this Court’s jurisprudence has often recognized that “to
accommodate public and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is
usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure,” we have also recognized
that the “Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such
suspicion . . . .” Therefore, although this Court has only sanctioned suspicionless
searches in limited circumstances, namely, programmatic and special needs searches,
we have never held that these are the only limited circumstances in which searches
43
absent individualized suspicion could be “reasonable” . . . .

Indeed, continued Justice Thomas, the officer’s search of parolee Samson was
reasonable given California’s concerns about “recidivism, public safety, and
reintegration of parolees into productive society . . . .”44 This conclusion, said
Justice Thomas, was neither “unprecedented” nor “remarkable.”45

37. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 41923 (probationers and parolees),
42931, 43639 (roadblocks), 407 ( “junkyard” search case).
38. See id. at 37279, 44868 (searches incident to arrest and consent searches).
39. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
40. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 38081, 408, 41920 (explaining, for
example, the Court’s holdings extending the reasonable-suspicion inquiry to certain “protective sweeps
of residences” for dangerous persons when an arrest is made there, fairly invasive searches of school
children’s bodies, and searches of probationers’ and parolees’ homes).
41. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 80 (2001) (noting individualized suspicion
is generally dispensed with only in special needs and related cases); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,
309 (1997) (describing the “category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches” as “closely
guarded”).
42. 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
43. Id. at 855 n.4 (citations omitted).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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But Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justices Souter and Breyer,
insisted that Thomas’s conclusion was indeed unprecedented because “[t]he
suspicionless search is the very evil the Fourth Amendment was intended to
stamp out.”46 Accordingly, exceptions to its prohibition should be “closely
guarded.”47 Moreover, insisted Stevens, “if individualized suspicion is to be
jettisoned, it must be replaced with measures to protect against the state actor’s
unfettered discretion,”48 measures that Stevens found missing despite the
majority’s insistence that California law’s broadly worded statutory prohibition
against “arbitrary, capricious or harassing” searches was sufficient.49 But Stevens
had little confidence that better discretion-limiting means than individualized
suspicion were either feasible or wise. Concluded Stevens,
The requirement of individualized suspicion, in all its iterations, is the shield the
Framers selected to guard against the evils of arbitrary action, caprice, and
harassment. To say that those evils may be averted without that shield is, I fear, to pay
50
lipservice to the end while withdrawing the means.

Finally, said Stevens, such lipservice is counterproductive because searches
and seizures lacking individualized suspicion “inflic[t] dignitary harms that
arouse strong resentment in parolees and undermine their ability to reintegrate
into society.”51
C. Lip Service
Yet the Court, as well as lower courts, pays “lip service” in other cases too,
insisting that it is retaining and vigorously applying a rule of individualized
suspicion while doing no such thing. For example, the Court sometimes finds a
small number of generalizations alone sufficient to establish individualized
reasonable suspicion, as it infamously did in holding that unprovoked flight
from the police in high-crime (generally meaning poor, predominantly racialminority-populated) areas, but not low-crime ones, alone establishes reasonable
suspicion to stop a suspect52generalizations whose accuracy are themselves
belied by empirical evidence, at least according to the dissenters in that case
and to several commentators.53 Lower courts seem to have taken this and other
holdings of the Court as a signal, repeatedly finding “individualized” reasonable
suspicion on the most general of evidence.54

46. Id. at 857–58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 860 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 860 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 841 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 865 (citing the majority opinion, 547 U.S. at 856, and citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19,
29 (1968)).
52. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
53. See id. at 12639 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment
Disrespect: From Elian to the Internment, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2294300 (2002).
54. See David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric
Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 975 (1998).
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In the area of probable cause, lower courts often apply somewhat vapid
generalizations as universal principles to determine the likely credibility of
informants, particularly when informants’ stories directly contradict one
another, thus ignoring the case-specific adequacy of these generalizations. Thus
courts generally assume that citizen (as opposed to criminal) informants and
police informants are truthful, that discrepancies within eyewitness’s
descriptions are unimportant, that putative victims with potential ulterior
motives still do not lie, and that private retail-store guards are inherently
credible.55 These same courts generally reject skepticism or the need for further
investigation, despite evidence suggesting the wisdom of both.56
Likewise, many courts rely increasingly on “constructive probable cause,”
finding probable cause in hindsight from combining the knowledge of several
officers, none of whom individually had reasonable suspicion. Courts construct
probable cause even absent case-specific proof that officers ever exchanged the
information.57 Similarly, the Court has recently found individualized probable
cause based largely on guilt by association, while insisting it was doing no such
thing.58
Still another complication arises from the position of some judges and
academics (though a minority position among the courts) that probable cause is
a variable standard, its meaning changing with a variety of circumstances,
including the crime’s severity, whether the social harm has occurred or
imminently will occur, and a host of other factors.59 Prominent adherents of this
position include Judges Henry Friendly and Richard Posner and academic
theorists Joseph Grano, Albert Alschuler, Craig Lerner, and William Stuntz.60
Although these writers tend to focus on the variability of the quantitative (how
convinced must the reasonable officer be?) and qualitative (did that officer rely
on sufficiently trustworthy evidence?) aspects of probable cause, the logic of
their position would also embrace accepting variability in the degree of required
individualization as well.61

55. See Jessica Ward, Do the Clothes Make the Man?: Implications of a Witness’ Status in the
Determination of Probable Cause, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2005 (2001).
56. See id.
57. See Simon Stern, Constructive Knowledge, Probable Cause, and Administrative
Decisionmaking, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085 (2007).
58. See Maclin, supra note 4 (reviewing the case law on guilt by association and concluding that, in
a post–Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), world, the Court embraces such guilt). For a discussion
of Pringle’s facts and reasoning, see TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 18994.
59. See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951 (2003).
60. See Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 156566 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (opinion authored by
Richard Posner); United States v. Soyka, 394 F.2d 443, 45253 (2d. Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., dissenting);
Albert Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 24556
(1984); Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates,
17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 50305 (1984); Lerner, supra note 59, at 101525; William Stuntz, Local
Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 213743, 2185 (2002).
61. See Lerner, supra note 59, at 101521 (summarizing these thinkers’ views and adding Lerner’s
own).
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In the pages to come, I will not be challenging the notion that individualized
suspicion must sometimes be diluted or even eliminated to serve sound
constitutional policy. By constitutional policy, I mean the most desirable way to
accommodate the tension among individual interests, state interests, and the
safety and security of the People.62 But I am arguing that fiddling with
individualized suspicion, if done, must be done candidly, with reluctance and
caution, and with full awareness of the costs and benefits involved. Such
awareness must extend as well to a careful judgment about whether the costs
exceed the benefits and to how to reduce those costs. Cost considerations must,
of course, include reducing the opportunity costs of not using, or of
substantially weakening, individualized suspicion.
My primary goal in this article, therefore, is to specify the costs and benefits
of individualized suspicion, though primarily the benefits because they, unlike
the costs, have rarely been closely analyzed. Indeed, the benefits of
individualized suspicion are usually recounted at a high level of generality,
situated in vague appeals to history, tradition, justice, and state phobia, with
little real explanation of what they mean or why we should care.63 Nevertheless,
though the costs of individualized suspicion have been concretely recited
elsewhere, I hope to do so here in a slightly different manner than other
theorists to highlight their significance more starkly. This article is thus
decidedly an exercise in pragmatic constitutionalism, focusing more on the realworld consequences of constitutional rules than on the history, tradition, and
precedent often used in constitutional interpretation (though these too play an
illustrative role here).64
D. A Roadmap
Section II of this article examines in more detail just what defines
individualized suspicion. Some critics seem to believe that it does not exist, a
delusion resting on a false and exaggerated understanding of the distinction
between the general and the particular. That is a view I hope to debunk.
Section III explores the benefits of individualized suspicion. Those benefits
include error-reduction; individual and group-voice-promotion in political
62. Cf. 16A AM. JUR. Const. Law §467 & nn.1213 (2010) (describing case law on constitutional
free speech as embodying a “constitutional policy” reflecting a “profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Search and Seizure History as Conversation: A Reply to Bruce P. Smith, 6
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 765 (2009) (articulating an extended defense of the roles of history and numerous
other data sources in crafting constitutional policy under the Fourth Amendment, a constitutional
“conversation” that partly defines American peoplehood).
63. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318, 322 (1997) (holding that overriding the normal
preference for individualized suspicion requires state demonstration of an interest sufficiently
“important,” “vital,” and “substantial,” a test not met by a justification that “diminishes personal
privacy for a symbol’s sake”).
64. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 725 (summarizing the various data sources
used in constitutional interpretation).
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affairs; encouraging deliberation, transparency, and accountability by law
enforcement; avoiding self-fulfilling prophecies; showing respect for persons by
honoring what makes each individual unique; discouraging racial bias; and
promoting strong, pragmatic rights-cultures.
Section IV starts by briefly outlining the well-known costs of individualized
suspicion. Those costs include freeing some of the guilty; undermining crimedeterrence; failing to prevent imminent future harm, especially if connected to
terrorism; raising the costs of investigation; reducing public safety and
governmental legitimacy more generally; and pushing courts to limit the Fourth
Amendment’s scope to avoid incurring other costs.
Section IV continues by offering guidelines for balancing costs and benefits
in individual cases, including ways to reduce the costs of dispensing with or
diluting individualized suspicion in its most muscular form when that is deemed
workable. Examples analyzed will include an illustrative case involving the
Court’s reliance on a spurious generalization.
Section V concludes by summarizing what has come before and offering
thoughts for the future.
II
WHAT IS “INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION,” AND WHY SHOULD WE CARE?
This section rebuts two broad claims. First, generalities, not particularities,
are the hallmark of sound reasoning; particularized analysis is thus an illusion.
Second, the benefits of generalizing ordinarily exceed its costs, while the same
cannot be said for individualizing. Both rebuttals address “nonspurious”that
is, trustworthygeneralizations, the argument becoming even stronger for
spurious or suspect ones. Illustrative pit bulls, big sisters, jealous boyfriends,
and Jersey cops will appear along the way. But first one must ask, with more
conceptual specificity than scholars have done so far, “Just what is
individualized suspicion anyway?”
A. Defining Individualized Suspicion
65

“[T]o generalize is to be an idiot. To particularize is the alone distinction of merit.”

1. Pit Bulls and the Purported Perils of Particularism
Law professor and philosopher Frederick Schauer has railed against what he
calls “particularism.” Particularism, as he defines it, is the idea that right
decisions turn most importantly on doing what is right for this case, this person,
this occasion.66 “Rightness” here is not only a matter of accuracy but also of
morality and justice.67 Thus, to the pure particularist,
65. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES AND STEREOTYPES x (2003) (quoting
WILLIAM BLAKE, ANNOTATIONS TO SIR JOSHUA REYNOLD’S DISCOURSES (1808)).
66. See id. at ix, 1920.
67. See id.
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[a]ll human beingsteenage males who drive cars, ex-convicts, used-car salesmen,
Scots, accountants, and everyone elsedeserve to be treated as individuals and not
simply as members of a group . . . and actuarial decisions about human beings are in
68
most instances morally wrong.

Schauer argues instead for the virtues of generalization, which he sees as
pervasive in our decisionmaking, inevitable, and frequently more accurate, and
often more just, than the “context[ualism]” of the particularists.69 Despite this
harsh rhetoric, however, Schauer ends up defending a more-modest version of
his thesis, and it is this more-modest version that is illuminating here.
Schauer bases much of his thesis on the argument that there is in fact no
conceptual distinction between the particular and the general. He uses anti-pitbull ordinances as an example. These ordinances prohibit pit-bull ownership in
certain localities on the theory that this breed of dog is far more dangerous to
life and limb than other breeds.70 Pit-bull lovers assail these ordinances as based
on an unfair generalization, unfair either because it is untrue or, if often true,
because it is not true of their pit bulls.71
A more particularistic alternative, Schauer posits, would be to put each pit
bull in a room with a realistic-looking doll of a seven-year-old child to see
whether this particular dog reacts violently.72 But, says Schauer, the value of this
experiment itself turns on a generalization, namely, that a pit bull who is
aggressive in everyday, noncontrolled situations with real children will reveal
that aggression in controlled experiments with simulated ones.73 Yet, if that
assumption is warranted, it can only be so because we have observed many
other pit bulls, under otherwise similar circumstances, who have attacked real
children, also consistently doing so with the laboratory imitations.74 Concludes
Schauer,
It turns out, therefore, that even analyses that look individualized are less so than they
initially appear, because even individualized analyses are based on aggregate data
about the relevance of certain traits. What distinguishes the individualized
examination from the so-called profile, therefore, is only the fact that the latter is
obvious without closer inspection while the former is not, and that in some, but by no
means all, of the cases the individualized analysis will provide a better predictor of the
relevant behavior. But what appears to be an individualized analysis is simply an
75
aggregate of stereotypes . . . .

68. Id. at 19.
69. See id. at 1921; see also WILLIAM JAMES, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 209 (1890) (“[T]he
highest ethical life of the mind consists at all times in the breaking of rules which have grown too
narrow for the actual case.”).
70. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 5556.
71. See id. at 5658. But see Sallyanne K. Sullivan, Banning the Pit Bull: Why Breed-Specific
Legislation Is Constitutional, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279 (1988) (praising pit-bull ordinances).
72. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 6566.
73. See id. at 66.
74. See id. at 67.
75. Id. at 68–69. As Schauer recognizes, however, a broad array of philosophers, lawyers, and
feminists vehemently reject his conclusion. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103
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2. A Spectrum, Not a Dichotomy
But Schauer makes several important concessions. First, this quote seems to
speak of relative degrees of generality rather than a dichotomy of generality
versus specificity. Thus, he does not say that analyses that look individualized
are not so, but rather only that they are “less so” than they at first appear.76
Second, he later recognizes that “smaller generalizations” are often better
predictors than “larger ones.”77 Although he does not define these terms, his
examples suggest that “smaller generalizations” refer to the intersection of
many overlapping broader generalizations, thus narrowing the range of
individual cases covered by the stereotype (Schauer frequently uses the terms
“stereotype” and “generalization” interchangeably). For example, the
generalization that “young, non-neutered male pit bulls previously owned by
drug dealers, while having a proclivity to growl and having been trained for
aggression, are more likely to engage in unprovoked attacks against children” is
a small generalization, a “little stereotype.”78 A Venn diagram might clarify the
point:
KEY:
G:
Growling proclivity
DD: Drug-dealer–owned
AT: Aggression-trained

For clarity, this diagram considers only three of the traits from the pit-bull
examplegrowling proclivity, previously drug-dealer–owned, and aggressiontrained. But note that the shaded area, where these three traits intersect, is
much smaller than the circles representing each trait alone. In a diagram adding
the other traits of breed, gender, being nonneutered, and being young, the
shaded area would be smaller still. Schauer agrees that this little stereotype is
probably a better predictor of behavior than, and in some sense different from,
the bigger ones in isolation.79 But he sees this difference as one of degree, not
kind.80

HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990) (feminist and law professor); see also JONATHAN DANCY, MORAL
REASONS (1993) (philosopher).
76. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 6869.
77. See id. at 6869, 96 (using “smaller rather than larger” stereotypes language while insisting that
stereotypes are sometimes better at predicting than seemingly more-individualized analyses).
78. Id. at 6869.
79. See id.; cf. infra text accompanying notes 65–75 (summarizing Schauer’s arguments concerning
the relative error rates of particulars versus generalities).
80. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 69 (noting that when we engage in a seemingly individualized
analysis of a pit bull’s behavior, “we are not doing anything fundamentally different from what we do
when we make a prediction based on this dog’s being a pit bull”).
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3. When Quantitative Differences Become Qualitative
Quantitative differences often thereby become qualitative ones. Height
differences, for example, are not differences in kind within a certain range, but,
at the extremes, they change our world. The humor in a movie like Honey, I
Shrunk the Kids!,81 about a scientist who shrinks himself and his kids to the size
of ants, comes precisely from the audience’s intuitively recognizing this point.
Even focusing just on physical differences, the shrunken movie family faces
existential threats that the rest of us do notdeath by termites, mosquitoes,
mice, falling flowers, and ruts in soil. But they also can do things we cannot,
such as crawl through keyholes, spy from mouse holes, and fill their bellies
happily with crumbs fallen to the floor. Their world even looks different than
when they were large, for they see skin pores as craters, snowflakes as works of
art, grass as skyscrapers.82 Their social world is radically changed, too. They are
invisible to the big people and, if they were visible, they would be treated like
lab rats, neither free nor able to safely attend movies, commute to work, or visit
libraries as they choose. Their social circle becomes limited to those who can
most understand their plight: other very little people.
a. Dogs who are one-of-a-kind. Return to the less-fanciful pit-bull
example. If hundreds of traits were added into the mix, it would be hard to see
an individual pit bull as just a collection of stereotypes. Adding the size of a
particular dog’s littermates; how he got along with them; who his trainer was;
what the training regimen was; whether there were many times that he refused
to fight, even upon his master’s orders; indeed, all his behaviors and life
experiences would be illustrated by not just a very small Venn diagram of a
kind of pit bull, but rather a pretty good description of one particular pit bull:
“Rex.” Yet even this unusual, perhaps one-of-a-kind, combination of numerous
intersecting generalities would not do Rex justice. Rex may display unique, or
at least rare, traits that distinguish him from other pit bulls in a way that the
intersectionality of generalities simply does not adequately capture.
b. People who are one-of-a-kind. The argument is perhaps stronger for
human beings, whose complex, ambiguous, contradictory minds and
personalities allow for extraordinary combinations of behaviors and traits, and
who are arguably even more intensely social than dogs.83 A human belongs not
simply to a pack, breed, or gender, but to churches, political organizations,
movie fan clubs, book clubs, ethnicities, high schools, block associations, and
varied other groups.84 Each of us varies in the intensity with which we associate
with each type of group, but we define ourselves in part by our group
associations, including our workplaces, families, and friends.85 Simultaneously,

81. HONEY, I SHRUNK THE KIDS (Buena Vista Pictures 1989).
82. My description of Honey, I Shrunk the Kids is not only of what the movie depicted but also of
what it could have depicted given the movie’s premise. The “could haves” are inspired by Jonathan
Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels.
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we strive for some measure of uniqueness within each group and in distinction
from them all.86 There is significant empirical evidence that we succeed in doing
so.87 In any event, each of us is unique (and this would apply to animals too)
because only each person, and no one else, has experienced his own life.
For example, my parents tell me that my big sister, Ellen Nora, then fiveand-one-half years old, was scheduled to have her tonsils out when my mother
went into labor with me. My dad accompanied my sister to the operating room
but explained to her why he had to leave her alone for awhile with the nurse
and the doctor. My sister became so stressed by this turn of events that she
leaped off the table before her IV could be inserted, bit a huge hole in the
nurse’s leg, and kicked the surgeon hard in his groin! She then fled. The
hospital sued my nearly judgment-proof parents for quite a bit of money.
Perhaps others have experienced a similar chain of events (though I suspect
very few), but only this doctor and this nurse had the life experience of being
assaulted by my big sister.
Perhaps, as with dogs in many states, my parents should have been subjected
to the “one-bite rule”88free from suit for my sister’s attack on the nurse but
not free from liability for future such attacks. The underlying rationale for such
a rule is that once the individual dog (or, here, individual child) has shown
violence, that is good particularized evidence of this dog’s (or this child’s)
dangerous proclivities.89 As the pit bulls’ defenders put it, punish “deeds, not
breeds.”90
However, Schauer objects to this argument because it applies only after the
harm is done.91 That cost, he argues, is too great; it is better to rely on
probabilistic prediction to prevent harms in the first place than to adopt an
individualized approach that triggers liability only once someone has suffered.92

83. See generally MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, HUMAN: THE SCIENCE BEHIND WHAT MAKES US
UNIQUE (2008) (arguing for the uniqueness and complexity, especially the social complexity, of the
human animal).
84. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 13437 (1999).
85. See id. at 135, explaining,
[H]arm to the individual harms the group. We partly define ourselves by our group
affiliations. Are we black or white? Jewish or Christian? Republican or Democrat? Our
attitudes, beliefs, and assumptions are in part shaped by the groups with which we identify.
Gender . . . is certainly at the core of self-identity. Our sense of being ‘male’ or ‘female’ and
what we believe that means are central to who we are. Although all individuals are unique,
some part of how we express ourselves draws on group self-concepts as ‘man’ or ‘woman.’
86. See infra text accompanying notes 33382.
87. See id.
88. See J.D. Lee & Barry A. Lindahl, Liability for Wild and Domestic Animals, in 4 MODERN
TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 37:5 (2d ed. 2009).
89. See id.
90. Alexandra Stanley, New York Acts to Lift Pit Bull Controls, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 1991, at B1.
91. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 70.
92. See id. at 7071.
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This argument is important for several reasons. Notably, it assumes that
individualization is indeed something real and not merely a form of
generalization in disguise.93 Furthermore, it accepts that whether this is a good
or a bad thing is a contextual question requiring a balancing of costs and
benefits.94 Finally, his argument reveals that the probative value of moreindividualized evidence is nevertheless dependent upon a generalization. In the
case of the one-bite rule, that generalization is that an individual’s prior actual
behavior (whether the individual is dog or human) is a useful (not necessarily
perfect or even more likely than not) predictor of future behavior. Yet this
judgment still retains a relatively individualized quality because it turns on
observations of this individual’s prior behavior rather than assumptions about
that behavior based entirely on class membership.
4. Of Character Evidence, Relativity, and Cost-Benefit Analysis
Predicting future behavior based on past behavior is generally a form of
character evidence, the argument being that the prior behavior indicates the
kind of person (or dog) you are, such persons being more likely to think or act
in certain ways.95 One significant problem with such evidence, however, is that
fact finders (such as juries) or other governmental decisionmakers (such as
police) may give such evidence, despite its somewhat individualized nature,
undue weight.96 Thus decisionmakers might ignore base rates (whether most
dogs or persons engage in the behavior at issue at the same, or a lesser, or a
greater rate than does this individual).97 Similarly, evidence that John has
engaged in twice as many violent acts as most people is relevant, but only
modestly so, if his total lifetime number of violent acts is but two.98 Additionally,
John’s violence might be highly contextual, such as being directed only at
unfaithful girlfriends.99 That context raises serious questions about how valuable
John’s past violence is in predicting future violence in very different situations.

93. Id. at 6970 (“This alternative does appear to diminish the extent of predictive generalization,
for by restricting only those dogs already determined to have committed an attack it eliminates the
possibility of over inclusiveness, at least if we continue to assume no mistakes in the process of
determining which dogs are guilty.”).
94. See id. at 125 (“If it turns out that the coarser (and thus broader) generalization fares better on
the benefit-cost analysis, the argument for its representing a case of fundamental injustice is much
weaker once we see that the only plausible replacement is a finer (and thus narrower) generalization.”).
95. See STEVEN I. FRIEDLAND, PAUL BERGMAN & ANDREW E. TASLITZ, EVIDENCE LAW AND
PRACTICE 9094 (3d ed. 2007).
96. See id. at 91.
97. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 9495, 179, 317 n.16 (defining and illustrating “base rates”).
98. See FRIEDLAND, BERGMAN & TASLITZ, supra note 95, at 91; Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note
5, at 65–72 (analyzing the “predictive power” of character traits).
99. See FRIEDLAND, BERGMAN, & TASLITZ, supra note 95, at 91, 96 (discussing analogous gang
members example).
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It is for reasons like this that the law often prohibits use of character
evidence at trials.100 Trials, of course, generally involve proving past wrongful
behavior, but most commentators recognize that character is as relevant to
proving what happened as to what will happen.101 Nevertheless, this relevance is
alone insufficient to justify admissibility. Even if character evidence is more
particularized than a highly general stereotype, the law’s treatment of the
evidence again turns on a careful cost-benefit analysis.102 Police, like everyday
people and judges at trials, must similarly make use of character to judge past
guilt or future imminent criminality.103 Whether, when, and how the law should
let them do so will thus likewise be a question of balancing.
Despite the initial vehemence with which Schauer makes his argument, he
ultimately concedes that he cannot totally deny the “logical distinction between
the particular and the general.”104 Indeed, he says (and I agree) that nothing is
gained by exploring the metaphysical literature on the question. Rather, “the
commonsense distinction between a thing and a group of things will suffice.”105
But Schauer is probably right that reasoning without some generalizations is
impossible. Accordingly, there is a spectrum of relative generality versus
specificity.106 The practical question is where, as a matter of wise policy, to place
ourselves on that continuum. Ultimately, I disagree with Schauer only in that I
see the place chosen on the spectrum as becoming at some point a difference in
kind rather than degree.107 Yet we agree that where we choose to fit on the
generality–specificity spectrum is at least partly a question of balancing the
costs and benefits of that particular choice.108 Before examining the relevant
costs and benefits involved in the probable-cause and individualized-suspicion
determination in criminal cases, I turn, however, to examining the general
nature of cost-benefit reasoning about degrees of particularity.

100. See id. at 159–64 (summarizing the character evidence rules in the Federal Rules of Evidence as
generally barring evidence of character to prove conduct but containing a variety of exceptions,
qualifications, and complexities).
101. See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 5, at 6572.
102. See FRIEDLAND, BERGMAN & TASLITZ, supra note 95, at 994 (summarizing the cost-benefit
analysis underlying the character evidence rules).
103. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 199200 (analyzing Fourth Amendment law
concerning the use of character evidence to prove probable cause).
104. SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 10506.
105. See id.
106. See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 5, at 2430.
107. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 6570.
108. See supra notes 9194 and accompanying text.
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B. Why We Should Care
1. Nonspurious Generalizations: Some Costs and Benefits
Schauer by no means endorses relying on all generalizations. Rather, the
only candidates are “nonspurious” ones.109 By “nonspurious,” he means
empirically supported.110 Thus, racial profiling relies on spurious stereotypes if
the stereotype is wrong, or at least if its “rightness” lacks empirical proof.111 But
to be “right,” a generalization need not be true most of the time, or even more
often than not.112 All that is required is that there be empirical evidence that the
assertion is more true of one group than another.113 Spuriousness is thus a
comparative concept.114 Accordingly, if it were true that twenty percent of all
white drivers speed on New Jersey highways, but that twenty-five percent of all
African American drivers on those highways do so, then an officer’s staking out
a stretch of highway traveled primarily by black drivers to maximize his catch of
speeders would be relying upon a nonspurious stereotype115 (even this creates its
own problems).116
Schauer recognizes that any generalization does “imperfect justice”—that is,
it does wrong to those members of the group who do not fit the stereotype.117
The degree to which it does wrong is its error rate. In the New Jersey highway
example above, the error rate for African Americans is seventy-five percenta
very high rate. Of course, in this example, the officer will stop only those
African Americans whom he actually sees speeding. But that would not be true
if the stereotype were, “Twenty-five percent of African American drivers on
New Jersey highways possess cocaine while driving, though only twenty percent
of whites do so.” Cocaine in a glove compartment is visible to the officer only
after he stops and searches the car. Therefore, if the African American cocaineuser stereotype were relied upon to stop and search African American drivers,
seventy-five percent of those stopped would be delayed, frightened, and
humiliated, though perfectly innocentand this would be true even if the
stereotype were nonspurious. Error rates are thus one cost to consider in
measuring the social value of a stereotype.
Of course, Schauer recognizes, such costs could theoretically be reduced if
we have a means for error correction.118 However, error-correction systems can

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 7, 1113.
See id. at 7.
See id. at 13, 1516, 22.
See id. at 11.
See id. at 1113.
See id. at 1112.
This example is mine but is inspired by a discussion of the New Jersey police in DAVID A.
HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 5360 (2003).
116. See infra text accompanying notes 27172 (discussion of the “ratchet effect”).
117. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 47.
118. See id. at 4748.
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be costly too.119 Thus, flatly prohibiting commercial airline pilots over age sixty
to fly rests on the stereotype that older pilots are less likely to be physically fit
than younger ones and consequentially less capable of flying safely.120 Even if
this is a nonspurious stereotype, it may force some perfectly healthy, capable
older pilots into retirement, new careers, or unemployment.121
One alternative means of error correction would be to subject all pilots over
age sixty to a physical. Those who pass could still fly.122 Paying for physicals,
however, costs money.123 Additionally, the purpose of such a physical is not
simply to determine blood pressure or white-blood-cell count but to answer the
more ambiguous question, “Is this pilot fit to fly?” To leave such a question to
doctors, complains Schauer, is to give them a discretion they perhaps ought not
to have.124 Moreover, the vaguer questions like fitness to fly, turned over to
clinical judgment, create their own error rates.125 One solution is to return to
rule-like safeguards, for example, “You are fit to fly if your reaction time is X,
your eyesight Y, and your blood pressure Z.” Yet that is to return to
generalities and to the imperfect justice they provide.126
Indeed, more broadly, Schauer objects to particularism because once we
replace generalitiesfrequently meaning ruleswith individualized judgment,
someone must make that judgment. If that someone must act uncontrolled by
rules, she gains discretion, which we might have reason to fear.127 Moreover,
Schauer insists that even experienced decisionmakers’ choices will often result
in higher error rates than will relying upon purely actuarial judgments.128 His
primary examples concern predictions of future dangerousness, such as
sentencing and parole decisions for violent criminals, or in release decisions for

119. See id. at 5354.
120. See id. at 12426.
121. See id. at 10813.
122. See id. at 12223.
123. There are over 42,000 commercial-airline pilots in the United States, see id. at 122, and the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has at least implicitly concluded that the cost of periodically
testing them all far exceeds any benefits, see id. at 126.
124. See SCHAUER, supra note 65. at 12223 (arguing that individualized medical testing of every
commercial-airline pilot would likely still result in significant numbers of false positives and false
negatives concerning the ability of each tested pilot to fly safely); id. at 5354 (arguing that all errorcorrection systems introduce their own error rates and give the correctors discretion that inevitably
results in disparities among decisions involving seemingly similar circumstances; such disparities create
the appearance of arbitrariness).
125. See id. at 5354, 12223.
126. An approach in the middle of the generalizing spectrum would be that, rather than testing all
pilots, we test only those over a certain age. See id. at 127. Yet this approach still is a far stretch from
the individualized end of the spectrum and has thus far been rejected by the FAA “as too risky to
public safety because the available tests produce too many false negatives and because certain agerelated correlates cannot be identified in advance by any existing test.” Id. at 128. The FAA’s solution,
therefore, has simply been to mandate pilot retirement at age sixty. See id. at 108.
127. See id. at 5354, 12223.
128. See id. at 9697.
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the mentally ill.129 He maintains that the data show the superiority in these areas
of actuarial methods over the clinical judgments of psychologists.130 Yet morerecent research suggests that clinical judgment combined with actuarial methods
sometimes does an even better job.131
Schauer also argues, however, that combining otherwise-valid profiles with
race in certain instances increases the predictive power of law-enforcement
profiling,132 though here, once again, other writers read the empirical data as
showing that race generally decreases profiling’s accuracy.133 Still, the data in
theory could come out the other way, and Schauer’s main point is simply that
“generalism” is not always less accurate than particularism.134 Relative accuracy
depends upon the question at issue and the state of our relevant empirical
knowledge.135 Moreover, he asks, is it really better to replace nonspurious
profiling with an individual officer’s unguided discretion?136
2. The Problem of Discretion in the “Real World” of the Fourth
Amendment
Here Schauer again has a point. Rule-like reasoning will likely constrain
police behavior more effectively, all else being equal, than giving police
unconstrained discretion.137 Notably, the Fourth Amendment itself contains no
rules.138 At best, “probable cause” is a mere standard. Rules articulate concrete
129. See id.
130. See id., at 9697.
131. See GARY B. MELTON, JOHN PETRILA, NORMAN G. POYTHRESS & CHRISTOPHER A.
SLOBOGIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS (2d ed. 1997); Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical
Assessments of Dangerousness, 7 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 409 (2001). Schauer describes these authors
as representative of “occasional dissenting voices.” SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 318 n.19. However,
these voices are consistent with the most recent state of the research and are, in any event, the voices I
find most persuasive. See CHRISTOPHER A. SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 111, 312 n.30 (2006).
132. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 169, 181 (at ports of entry, in certain street-level narcotics
offenses, and planned terrorist bombings of planes).
133. See HARRIS, supra note 115, at 7390. Schauer himself agrees that much racial profiling is also
likely spurious, despite his insistence that some racial profiling is likely nonspurious. See SCHAUER,
supra note 65, at 17781.
134. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 96, 17781, 18990.
135. See id. at 96, 17786, 18990.
136. See id. at 173. Schauer observes as well that the visibility of race may, on the other hand, also
sometimes give it more salience and thus more weight than it deserves, see id. at 18889, and that there
may sometimes be good policy reasons for excluding race as a consideration even when it is
nonspurious. See id. at 19798. Moreover, many professionals, including police officers, can err in their
judgments simply because of overconfidence in their accuracy and underappreciation of base rates. See
id. at 318 n.20.
137. See generally SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 19501990 (1993).
138. The Fourth Amendment speaks in broad, grand language meant more to evoke majesty than
effect clarity:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
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factual circumstances that activate them or that are “otherwise determinate in
the community.”139 Standards rely on abstractions containing the underlying
goal of the law.140 Of course, this distinction is not as sharp as it seems, for rules
themselves come in degrees of specificity, as do standards, and it may be hard to
judge just when the dividing line between a standard and a rule is crossed.141
Nevertheless, the distinction is a useful and commonsense one. Legal actors
need some sort of direction, and greater specificity increases that direction.
Accordingly, courts over time may strive in each area of the law, where feasible,
to shift standards closer to rules.142 Even if courts do not intend to do so, the
mere growth of precedent addressing the application of standards to an
increasingly diverse set of factual circumstances will be read by lawyers seeking
guidance for clients as creating an ever more rule-like body of law.143
Nevertheless, there are practical limits on this endeavor. No lawgivers,
legislative, judicial, or executive, can anticipate every circumstance that may
arise within the scope of the problem they want to address.144 Some critics also
argue that courts especially are institutionally ill-equipped, lacking the
investigative resources, diversity, and political sensitivity of a legislature to craft
highly specific bodies of rules.145 Additionally, some tasks involve so much
variation that it may be infeasible to create sufficiently specific rules to govern
every class of conceivable circumstances.146 Even if we could do so, overly
complex rulebooks can themselves become confusing, self-contradictory, and
otherwise too hard to apply effectively.147 Such complexities also raise training

upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
139. See Mark D. Rosen, Our Non-uniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of Constitutional
Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1129, 1142 (1999).
140. See id.
141. See id. at 114243. Schauer has himself written an enlightening analysis of the rules-versusstandards distinction. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 104 & n.35 (1991).
142. See Rosen, supra note 139, at 114243.
143. See id. at 114350.
144. See, e.g., ROBERT J. MARTINEAU & MICHAEL B. SALERNO, LEGAL, LEGISLATIVE, AND
RULE DRAFTING IN PLAIN ENGLISH 79 (2005) (“When commentators speak of intentional or
purposive ambiguity, and especially when they say it may be desirable, what they are talking about is
vagueness, leaving it up to administrative agencies or the courts to work out the precise parameters of
the term.”).
145. See, e.g., CRAIG BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION
(1993).
146. Think about the problem, for example, of drafting legislation governing protecting the
confidentiality of telephone calls in a world, not too long past, that had neither heard nor thought of
“Skype,” which permits making phone calls via the internet. Moreover, legislation may embrace
breadth for political reasons, even when concrete eventualities can be foreseen “as a way of glossing
over controversies for which consensus is not reached.” MARTINEAU & SALERNO, supra note 144, at
95. This approach is common because “the participants in the legislative process do not easily concede
defeat and prefer to declare partial victory.” Id.
147. Consider the Internal Revenue Code.
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costs. Furthermore, all rules include some things within their governance,
excluding others, and we may fear that rules will end up inadvertently excluding
some things that the lawgiver would want to regulate, thus undermining the
lawgiver’s broader goals.148 Granting decisionmakers some measure of discretion
is thus frequently unavoidable, often desirable. It once again becomes a policy
choice about how much discretion to assign.149
The Court has, however, generally been moving away from more rule-like
Fourth Amendment precedent toward the more standard-like end of the
spectrum in many of the most important areas governing police conduct.150
Perhaps the most salient example is the Court’s overturning the Aguilar–
Spinelli rule for the determination of informant trustworthiness in making the
decision whether there is probable cause.151 The Aguilar–Spinelli rule mandated
that magistrates, and thus police, ignore tips that failed to survive a twopronged test: (1) Was there sufficient evidence of the tipster’s credibility
(truthfulness)? (2) Was there sufficient evidence that the tipster had a reliable
basis for his report?152 If either prong was not met, the tip could not be
considered in the probable-cause determination. Lower courts also developed
an extensive body of case law to guide magistrates and police concerning when
each prong was met. The rule gave police an incentive to uncover evidence
supporting both prongs.
But in Illinois v. Gates,153 the Court replaced this test with a more flexible,
standard-like, totality-of-the-circumstances test in which the two Aguilar–
Spinelli prongs became mere factors: weakness in one former prong could be
made up by strength in the other. Any tip, no matter how weak, was at least
relevant, in combination with other circumstances, to deciding whether
probable cause existed.154 This more-flexible test, of course, gives the police less
guidance but more discretion. The Gates Court at least implicitly recognized
this consequence but embraced it, expressing fear that the previous rule was
undermining police ability to ensure public safety because it was, or at least

148. See MARTINEAU & SALERNO, supra note 144, at 9596, 109.
149. See id., at 9596 (noting that legislatures may make the policy choice to leave interpretive
discretion in, for example, the hands of administrative agencies or courts).
150. Indeed, leading criminal-procedure scholar Craig Bradley complained about just this problem
in a study done some sixteen years ago. See BRADLEY, supra note 145. The Court’s continuing
expansion of police discretion in the years since Bradley first published his book is by now largely
undisputed. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, United States v. Whren: The Fourth Amendment Problem with
Pretextual Traffic Stops, in WE DISSENT: TALKING BACK TO THE REHNQUIST COURT: EIGHT CASES
THAT SUBVERTED CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS 90, 101 (Michael Avery ed., 2009) (“By
allowing police officers to use any traffic violation as a subterfuge to conduct an arbitrary and
unjustified narcotics investigation, the Court has given police officers across the nation virtually
unchecked discretion to interfere with the liberty and privacy of any motorist.”).
151. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
152. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 197200.
153. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
154. See id. at 23039; ELLEN PODGOR ET AL., MASTERING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: POLICE 5258
(2010) (explaining Gates and its reasoning and significance).
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probably was, allowing too many bad guys to get away with their crimes.155 That
public-safety theme has increasingly pervaded much of the Court’s other Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, leading it to expand police discretion through such
devices as the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule,156 increasing
deference to police expertise and professionalism,157 expanding the range of the
weaker “reasonable suspicion” test over its probable-cause forebear,158 as well as
expanding the number of searches permissible without any suspicion at all.159
Whether one applauds or derides this trend, the idea that police face varied
circumstances, often needing to act quickly and decisively, sometimes doing so
to avert grave danger, does suggest that police must unavoidably retain some
level of discretion in their jobs.160 A computer-like set of “if–then” rules for all
police conduct is neither feasible nor wise.161 The initial question, therefore, is
how much discretion to give them, not whether to do so at all. Even under the
Aguilar–Spinelli rule, police had significant discretion to act in a wide range of
situations, so long as they paid attention in their investigations to both prongs in
the analysis.162 Moreover, it is perfectly feasible to give police “guidelines,”
presumptive rules that can be ignored if the police have good, case-specific
reasons to do so.163 That constrains, without handcuffing, police discretion. A

155. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 23738; PODGOR ET AL., supra note 154, at 5258.
156. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
157. See supra notes 5456 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 5254 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 3541 and accompanying text.
160. Certainly this is the view of many officers, who “feel that their job is so difficult, so dangerous,
and so singular that no one who does not also wear the uniform can possibly understand it and that no
civilian should sit in judgment of the actions of a police officer.” DAVID A. HARRIS, GOOD COPS: THE
CASE FOR PREVENTIVE POLICING 86–87 (2005). This distrust of civilians is, I believe, fundamentally
misplaced. See SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 8 (2005) (“It is a
basic principle of a democratic society that the police should be answerable to the public.”). Yet, as a
descriptive matter, police do retain, and will vigorously defend, ample discretion. See HARRIS, supra, at
131 (“Most officers do nearly all their work unsupervised, only sporadically reporting in to their
sergeants or dispatchers and only rarely encountering a supervisory officer on the street.”). Continues
Harris, “Anything that intrudes on officer autonomya policy or directive from the precinct
commander or headquarters, a new law, or a court decisionbecomes a bone in the throat of the rankand-file officer.” Id. at 13132. As a normative matter, the police’s retaining significant discretion is
probably a wise thing so long as it is supplemented with mechanisms for guiding that discretion and
holding police accountable for its proper exercise. See generally WALKER, supra.
161. See HARRIS, supra note 160, at 94 (“There is still ‘no substitute for judgment. You must be
engaged as a supervisor’ with your officers. If you are . . . you’ll be able to tell which officers with
higher-than-average arrests or searches and seizures are doing their jobs properly and which ones are
not.”) (quoting Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Police Commander Linda Barone).
162. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 18586, 197200 (describing the many
flexible factors to be weighed in deciding whether each Aguilar–Spinelli prong has been met).
163. See HARRIS, supra note 160, at 94 (“The aim is not to command but to guide generally.”).
Harris elaborates,
Departmental policies crafted by members of the police department for members of the police
department have almost automatic legitimacy among the rank and file who must obey them.
They are more likely to be implemented, and more likely to be followed (even when
unpopular) than pronouncements on police behavior that come from other institutions, such
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still-looser approach does not make guidelines presumptive minima for
constitutional behavior, but at least hints to police how they can attain “safe
harbors” by structuring what sorts of things they should think about as they do
their work.164 Arguably, that is just what Gates does by retaining a reminder to
police to investigate and consider all the same evidentiary factors they
considered under Aguilar–Spinelli, while giving police greater deference should
those efforts prove partly unavailing.165 How much discretion to allow police is a
question whose answer depends upon factors that are partly normative (What
do constitutional values demand?), partly empirical (Which approach, Aguilar–
Spinelli or Gates, creates stronger incentives for police to do a “better job,”
however we define it?). On the normative front, some scholars argue that the
central purpose of the Fourth Amendment was aggressively to restrain lawenforcement discretion,166 while others disagree.167 On the empirical front,
disagreement seems to reign as well.168
3. The Problem of Imperfect Knowledge
The problem of imperfect knowledge complicates things still further.169 As
Schauer points out, even particularist approaches are not based upon perfect

as courts or legislative bodies. That is why formal departmental policies concerning
accountability and other aspects of preventive policing are essential. Policies describe the
contours of proper conduct by setting out the general parameters of how police officers should
respond to situations they face repeatedly.
Id. at 94; cf. WALKER, supra note 160, at 31 (noting that court decisions, especially those rooted in
constitutional law, can have only a limited impact on police behavior, partly because “so many critical
aspects of routine policing fall outside the purview of any court decision defining constitutional
standards,” and that, when they do fall within constitutional law’s purview, the Court “lacks the
institutional capacity to ensure compliance with its own decisions on a day-to-day basis”). This does not
mean, of course, that constitutional law decisions have no impact on police, but it does suggest that the
Court is well-advised to craft a regulatory scheme that creates incentives for other institutions to join in
the process of implementation. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking
the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76 MISS. L.J. 483 (2009) (illustrating one such
scheme).
164. See Taslitz, Expressive Fourth Amendment, supra note 163, at 55275.
165. See PODGOR ET. AL., supra, note 154, at 2127.
166. See Maclin, supra note 150, at 101 (“History shows that the Framers believed that the best way
to guard against arbitrary and unjustified governmental intrusions was to control the discretion of law
enforcement officers.”).
167. See Fabio Arcila Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law History of
Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2007) (arguing that magistrates during the
post-Revolutionary and immediate post–Fourth Amendment periods largely deferred to lawenforcement judgments concerning probable cause).
168. Compare WALKER, supra note 160, at 4951 (arguing that the Court’s modern Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has done much to professionalize police departments), with Thomas Y.
Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (And Still Need to Learn) About the “Costs” of the
Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611
(1983) (summarizing studies, including those critical of the exclusionary rule).
169. See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW
125 (2000) (explaining the pervasive problem of imperfect knowledge and the frequent superiority of
“local knowledge”).
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knowledge.170 We cannot know everything about another person or the situation
facing him. Moreover, police always face some time limits on their decisions—
often tight limits.171 As a practical matter, police can obtain only so much
information about a suspect in a reasonable period of time. Imperfect
knowledge may increase error rates, perhaps at times beyond the error rates
involved in actuarial reasoning.172
This criticism seems overstated. First, it is rare that the police have
nonspurious generalizations upon which to rely.173 Perhaps the march of social
science will change that one day,174 but police are largely stuck relying on their
common sense, experience, training, and guidelines from superiors. When
adequate empirical evidence is available, all four of these sources for police
decisionmaking may be improved. But otherwise, proven nonspurious actuarial
reasoning just is not an option for most police probable-cause decisions.
The statement that proven nonspurious actuarial reasoning is not an option
rests on two assumptions, both partly normative, the latter also partly empirical:
first, that the burden of proving “nonspuriousness” should be on the state, and
second, that proving nonspuriousness requires a sufficient body of sound socialscience data. But this proof cannot rest alone on police or lay experience or on
common sense. These are two assumptions that Schauer implicitly supports by
defining spurious generalizations as those “devoid of . . . empirical
foundations.”175 These assumptions also follow from the position to be defended
below that individualized suspicion is one important way for the state to justify
invading individuals’ privacy, property, and locomotive rights that must
otherwise be inviolate.176 In short, there is a “presumption of liberty.”177 A
170. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 10304.
171. See HARRIS, supra note 160, at 95, 156 (discussing high-speed chases, “[c]hasing crooks,” and
responding to 911 emergencies as among the standard tasks of policing).
172. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 10304.
173. Here I am talking specifically about such generalizations’ being used in making judgments
about probable cause or reasonable suspicion. “Profiles” are often touted as introducing science into
the probable-cause and reasonable-suspicion decisions, but in practice, few profiles have empirical
support, and most leave police with unfettered discretion while creating the false impression of the
opposite. See, e.g., TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 35360; Sharon L. Davies, Profiling
Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 45 (2003).
174. In areas of policing outside the Fourth Amendment, such as eyewitness identifications and
interrogations, empirical data supporting nonspurious generalizations is already slowly starting to
improve police investigative practices. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ACHIEVING JUSTICE:
FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY: REPORT OF THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTION’S AD HOC INNOCENCE COMMITTEE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCESS (2006). Although these areas are generally governed by the due-process clauses and the Fifth
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination, the results of these procedures can, of course, help to
establish probable cause by providing evidence of the wrongdoer’s identity. See TASLITZ, PARIS &
HERBERT, supra note 35, at 71015, 86976. Some empirically supported, nonspurious generalizations
may thus be available to aid police in the individualized-suspicion judgment in those jurisdictions that
have fully adopted the new investigative techniques and best practices dictated by these recent
developments in cognitive psychology.
175. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 7.
176. See infra text accompanying notes 293332.
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lawyer rejecting either or both of these assumptions might also reject my
conclusion (that valid actuarial reasoning thus far is rarely a police option in the
probable-cause area). Schauer himself tries to argue that police profiling is at
least one area in which adequate scientific evidence sometimes supports
actuarial reasoning.178 This may be true of some profiles, but simply is not true
for most profiles used in everyday policing.179
Yet even if actuarial reasoning in this area can wisely be given a wider
scope, that cannot eliminate particularistic police judgments. All legal rules
must be applied to facts. Historical “raw” facts, like “Did Jake punch Charley
or did someone else do so?” have indisputably true either–or answers.180 But
since we lack time machines, we face grave challenges in finding those facts.181
Other facts, such as whether an alleged offender in a homicide case acted in
cold blood or in self-defense, contain a more interpretive component, making
fact-finding still harder.182 Furthermore, fact-finding requires credibility
judgments whenever stories conflict and sufficiency of evidence judgments,
whatever the standard for “sufficient” may be.183 Fact-finders thus exercise
judgment in a way that vests them with enormous discretion.184 But in law
enforcement, it is the police who are, in the first instance, the fact-finders. They
must decide whether they have enough credible evidence that this individual
has committed a particular crime to whatever standard of proof controls if they
are to have probable cause.185 Even in a Schauerian world, therefore, the
problems of police discretion and of the accuracy of police judgment cannot be
eliminated.
If the criminal-procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights as a whole, or the
Fourth Amendment itself, express distrust of unconstrained law-enforcement
discretion,186 and if actuarial approaches, even nonspurious ones, cannot fully do
that job,187 then other approaches must be found. Such approaches could aim to
improve the quantity and quality of police deliberation (and we do have good
social science available about how to minimize the downsides of deliberation,

177. See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004).
178. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 3, 6, 22, 68, 126, 15598.
179. See sources cited supra note 173.
180. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Proving the Unprovable, 22 CRIM. JUST. 70, 7076 (2007) (reviewing
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE, AND
SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS (2007)) [hereinafter
Unprovable]; Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Science Evidence: Foundations, 5
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, (1998) (providing philosophical support for Slobogin’s position) [hereinafter
A Feminist Approach].
181. See Taslitz, Unprovable, supra note 180.
182. See Taslitz, A Feminist Approach, supra note 180, at 1346.
183. See id. at 3738 & n.170.
184. See id. at 4957.
185. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 196.
186. See Maclin, supra note 4, at 411.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 128-31.
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which can be many),188 as well as increasing the transparency and accountability
of police decisions and actions.189 Furthermore, if part of our concern about
police is that they act upon imperfect information, we can give them incentives
to collect more of the reasonably available information before acting.190
Probable cause partly embodies just these approaches to constraining police
discretion.191
4. Countervailing Policy Concerns, Even for Nonspurious Generalizations
Furthermore, as I noted earlier, Schauer himself recognizes that even when
nonspurious generalizations are likely to be more accurate than particularistic
judgments, there may be good policy reasons to reject actuarial reasoning.192
Some generalizations may, for example, add to the social stigma of historically
disempowered groups.193 Other generalizations might be mere masks for hostile
motives.194 Though Schauer does not mention them, generalizations can also
become self-fulfilling prophecies, changing social reality, rather than reflecting
it.195
Schauer also argues that we must sometimes replace a socially injurious
generalization with a compensatory generalization, rather than a particularistic
one, to adequately repair the injury done.196 For example, gender law might
mandate that, unless shown otherwise on a fair test applicable to both sexes, all
women must be presumed to have the same upper-body strength as men for
employment purposes.197 That is likely a false generalization, but it creates an
opportunity for those women who can do the job while compensating for a
history of exaggerating the quantity of upper-body strength needed, as well as a
history of failing to assess women’s true body strength—both factors having
been used as excuses simply to keep women out of the best-paying jobs.198 Such
compensating generalizations may thus in fact promote more-individualized

188. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Eyewitness Identification, Democratic Deliberation, and the Politics of
Science, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y, & ETHICS J. 271, 296323 (2006) (discussing the social science on
good deliberation in most contexts, though applying it to prosecutors).
189. See id. at 284. Rather than repeat here the detailed supporting analyses of deliberation,
transparency, and accountability that I have done elsewhere, see, e.g., id. at 296323; Andrew E. Taslitz,
Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with the Power to Inspire Political Action, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (Summer 2003), I have interwoven discussion of these benefits into this article’s
larger discussions of other social advantages of an individualized-suspicion requirement. See infra II–
IV.
190. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Police are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to Police Getting the
Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2010).
191. Id.
192. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 2223.
193. See id. at 2223, 3536, 139, 15054, 186, 199200, 21723.
194. See id. at 144.
195. See infra text accompanying notes 26283.
196. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 151.
197. See id. at 143, 14754.
198. See id.
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judgments by compelling employers either to accept that all women can
presumptively do the job or to individually test both all women and all men to
weed out those who truly cannot.199
Schauer makes one important final concession: even though most reasoning
is to one degree or another probabilistic, there is less justification for reliance
on predominantly probabilistic generalization in criminal cases than civil
cases.200 Given unavoidable uncertainty in virtually all decisionmaking, decision
theorists argue for the concept of discounting outcomes by the probability that
they are mistaken.201 In mathematical terms, this means multiplying the outcome
by the probability that it is right.202 Yet law generally makes dichotomous
decisionsplaintiff wins or losesrather than allow for probabilistic
discounting.203 Schauer bemoans this limitation in most civil cases but lauds it in
criminal cases.204 Thus, he explains, in criminal cases in which there is only a
seventy-percent likelihood of guilt, “even statisticians” would feel discomfort
over a guilty verdict.205 That discomfort stems from the high value our society
places on liberty and the consequent gravity of the error in convicting the
innocent.206 More simply put, to convict an offender but discount his sentence by
the thirty-percent chance of error is intolerable. For this reason, the principle of
expected value is “properly a stranger to the criminal law.”207 Given that
searches and arrests start the criminal process and carry a stigma in many
contexts merely for one’s being suspected of crime,208 Schauer’s caution should
be taken to heart in the probable-cause determination as well.

199. See id. Schauer also makes a political argument in favor of certain generalizations. Specifically,
he insists that a political communitya nationby definition requires emphasizing generality, namely
of shared constitutional norms, goals, and valuesover difference and particularity. See id. at 278300.
On this point Schauer is partly right (though I see both commonality and difference as essential to
nationhood and the supporting system of rights). See Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth
Amendment, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 7080 (2003).
200. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 89.
201. See id. at 8793.
202. See id. at 8788.
203. See id. at 90.
204. See id. at 8789.
205. See id. at 89.
206. See id. See also BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT (Larry King ed., 2006) (collecting essays,
many of which argue that this anti–expected-value principle underlies the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
burden of persuasion in criminal cases).
207. See SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 89.
208. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux: How Race Contributes to Convicting the
Innocent: The Informants Example, 27 SW. U.L. REV. 1076 (2009).
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III
THE BENEFITS OF INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION
The major social benefits of individualized suspicionparticularly those
involving questions of political morality209derive from making such suspicion a
prerequisite to invasive police action. An exploration of these social benefits
might begin with an examination of procedural and distributive fairness in the
context of “fair price theory.”
A. Fairness
1. Terminology and the Relevance of Fair-Price Theory
Individualized suspicion, particularly in the form of probable cause,
promotes fairness. The terms “fairness” and “justice” are often used
interchangeably210 and are so used here, for joining in the debate over whether
there is a logical distinction between the two terms does little to clarify my
argument. By “fairness,” I mean here either being treated in a satisfactory
fashionone meeting expectationsor in a just fashion, that is, a fashion that is
justified, meaning that the treatment is done for good reasons, “free of
favoritism or bias; impartial . . . just to all parties; equitable . . . consistent with
rules, logic or ethics.”211 This notion of fairness is rooted in social norms, the
“consensual rules of a society.”212
The first class of social-fairness norms—those involving perceived
satisfactory treatment—are sometimes labeled personal-fairness norms, with the
second class (involving “just” treatment) being labeled social-fairness norms.213
Violations of social-fairness norms produce far more-intense emotional
reactions than violation of personal-fairness norms,214 and the former is stressed
here.

209. By “political morality” I mean those moral principles governing how the state should treat its
citizens and vice versa. Such principles are normative, are implicit in much constitutional interpretation,
and bring with them many practical benefits that flow from enhanced governmental legitimacy. See
generally Taslitz, Respect, supra note 199 (exploring how such principles operate in interpreting the
Fourth Amendment). I distinguish the benefits of political morality from another important class of
benefitsthose enhancing the accuracy of police judgments. This latter class of benefits I have touched
on thus far and will do so repeatedly again here, but a fuller exploration of them may be found at
Taslitz, Police are People Too, supra note 190.
210. See NORMAN J. FINKEL, NOT FAIR: THE TYPOLOGY OF COMMONSENSE UNFAIRNESS 4358
(2001).
211. See, e.g., SARAH MAXWELL, THE PRICE IS WRONG: UNDERSTANDING WHAT MAKES A
PRICE SEEM FAIR AND THE TRUE COST OF UNFAIR PRICING 67 (2008).
212. See MAXWELL, supra note 211, at 7. For fuller explanations of the meaning of “social
norms”itself a contested conceptsee ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18 (2000). See
also Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp, Introduction, in SOCIAL NORMS xi, xiii (Michael Hechter &
Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001) (“As there is no common definition of social norms, there can be little
agreement about how to measure them.”).
213. See MAXWELL, supra note 211, at 7.
214. See id. at 9.
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Social-fairness norms themselves come in two types relevant to this
discussion: “distributive fairness,” or the fairness of outcomes, and “procedural
fairness,” or the fairness of the process by which the outcomes are achieved.215
Analyzing the application of these concepts to probable cause here draws on
political philosophy and two related strands of social science: the psychology of
substantive (distributive) and procedural justice and the economics of fair
pricing.216 The latter strand’s applicability might not be self-evident but turns on
analogies to markets and to the idea of a social contract.217 Many social-contract
theories turn on the idea that individuals join in a society to protect themselves
from the violence they might do to one another.218 Society in turn delegates
enforcement of the rules that prevent such violence to the state.219 However, the
police are the everyday arm of the state, wielding authority to threaten or use
force to maintain order.220 The state, and thus the police, must in turn be
restrained to prevent state violence from becoming a form of oppression akin to
that in the war of all against all—a war for whose avoidance the state was
originally formed.221
As with any contract, each party must give up something to gain something
else.222 Each ordinary citizen can thus in a sense be viewed, from one
perspective, as a “buyer” of police services to provide social order and
stability.223 The price paid by each citizen to the state in exchange for such order
includes, but is not limited to, taxes.224 The price also includes exposing one’s
self to the risk of facing restraints on one’s privacy, liberty, and property by the
police under certain circumstances.225 When those risks become realizedfor
example, when the police stop a citizen on the street for brief questioning (a
“Terry stop”),226 the price that individual pays has risen; now it is not merely the

215. See id. at 26.
216. On fair-pricing economics generally, see MAXWELL, supra note 211, summarizing the major
findings in the field. On the psychology of fairness generally, see HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH
IN LAW (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds. 2001).
217. For a summary of market-based thinking, see CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE MARKET SYSTEM:
WHAT IT IS, HOW IT WORKS, AND WHAT TO MAKE OF IT (2002). For a summary of social-contract–
based thinking, see Andrew E. Taslitz, Plugging into the Fourth Amendment’s Matrix, 22 CRIM. JUST.
26, 2729 (2007).
218. See TASLITZ, supra note 4, at 3.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 34, 79, 24344, 261.
221. See id.
222. This idea is embodied in ordinary contract law in the term “consideration.” See Peter A. Alces,
Suretyship and the Statute of Frauds, ch. 4, in THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 4:2 (2007).
223. Cf. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 208 (1995) (describing prosecutors as buyers and
defense counsel as sellers in a “market for plea bargains”).
224. See generally STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY
DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999) (defending the theory that taxes are the necessary price for citizenship).
225. Law-and-economics scholars will readily understand the idea that risks and lost opportunities,
including to exercise rights, can be understood as costs. See WILLIAM D. ROHLF, INTRODUCTION TO
ECONOMIC REASONING (6th ed. 2005).
226. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 317, 33253 (explaining Terry stops).
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risk but the reality of lost liberties that that individual incurs. To accept that
added price as legitimate, the person stopped must see the price he pays as fair.
What factors affect that perception is the subject of fair-price theory.
2. Procedural Fairness
There are three core aspects to whether a buyer sees a price as procedurally
fair: (1) voice and choice, (2) transparency, and (3) impartiality.227
a. Voice and choice. “Voice and choice” means that the buyer sees the
pricing process as controllable, at least in the sense of having input (“voice”)
into how the price is set.228 One goal of negotiation can be to give the buyer
precisely such input and control.229 However, often there is little, if any, room for
direct negotiation.230 For example, the price of canned beans in a supermarket is
usually fixed, the same for all buyers.231 Even when this is true, however,
“choice” can give “voice.” If the buyer is free to buy cheaper beans elsewhere,
the buyer can do so, thus sending the message to the more-expensive bean
retailer, “Bring down the price, or I will never buy from you again.”232 If all bean
sellers charge equal prices but offer different-quality beans, buying the better
beans likewise sends the message to the seller of poor-quality beans, “Do better
or lose my business.” If all beans are expensive and poor quality, the buyer can
forego beans entirely, spending her money on a different product in protest
against the entire bean business.233
But a person stopped by an officer and sent the message that he is not free
to leave (the very definition of a Terry stop)234 has at that moment no choice. He
must do as the officer says and, short of moving out of the jurisdictionan
unlikely and high-transaction-cost option235cannot employ a different officer
or set of officers to provide public safety. Nor, so long as he resides in America,
can he forego entirely the benefits and burdens of having police in the first

227. See MAXWELL, supra note 211, at 7374.
228. See id. at 7677.
229. See id.
230. For a discussion of the benefits of direct means of expressing voice via the legal system
whenever feasible, see TASLITZ, supra note 84, at 13451.
231. See MAXWELL, supra note 211, at 76 (making a similar point but using college textbooks as an
example).
232. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (exploring when economic actors choose “exit” and
when “voice” to get what they want and the connection between the two options).
233. See ROBERT PINDYCK & DANIEL RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 10230, 27779 (7th ed.
2008).
234. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 33242.
235. See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND
WHY IT MATTERS 26, 36, 3944, 49, 5460, 16364 (2001) (defining “transaction costs” and explaining
their significance).
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place.236 Likewise, he may try to “negotiate” his freedom or silence with the
officer, but he is largely at the officer’s mercy.237 The contract here is one of
adhesion.238
Probable cause, however, potentially gives the citizen some measure of
control over whether he must pay the price of actually being stopped. Because
the officer needs individualized suspicion, he cannot stop persons randomly.
Rather, he must have good reason to believe that this person has committed, or
is about to commit, a crime.239 By refraining from criminal conduct or from
actions that can be expected to raise suspicions of such conduct, the citizen
gains some control over whether he will pay the added price for social safety
and security of in fact being stopped by the police.240 The Court has, of course,
sanctioned stops on less than probable causeon mere reasonable suspicion.241
But because that lesser standard theoretically retains an individualizedsuspicion requirement, hopefully a robust one, the citizen still retains significant
control over the size of the risk that his liberties will be infringed by the police.
Probable cause and reasonable suspicion thus help to protect citizen autonomy.
This protection will, of course, be imperfect. But imperfection does not
render the protection valueless. Moreover, if a citizen believes that police
generally do their best to adhere to the individualized-suspicion mandate, he
will likely be eager to cooperate when stopped, assuming that answering the
officer’s questions will readily dissolve any mistaken suspicions.242 If the
suspicions nevertheless persist, a citizen who has done all he reasonably can to
avoid crime and suspicions of it will rightly expect an explanation, and a truly

236. This observation is true as a practical matter and as part of the American social contract. See
TASLITZ, supra note 4, at 44, 79, 24361 (explaining the role of the police in the American social
contract).
237. See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (upholding under the Fourth
Amendment Hiibel’s arrest for failing to reveal his name to an officer upon request); Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) (upholding arrest for drug possession when cocaine was found hidden
behind an upraised armrest in the back seat next to the back-seat passenger, but when there was no
evidence that Pringle, the front-seat passenger, knew of the cocaine’s presence and when the officer
threatened to arrest all three of the car’s occupants unless someone confessed).
238. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 342 (8th ed. 2004) (defining an “adhesion contract” as one to
which a “consumer . . . adheres . . . with little choice about the terms”).
239. There can be “anticipatory” probable causeprobable cause to believe that someone will
commit a crime in the future. See United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 (2006) (recognizing anticipatory
probable cause and articulating a test for when it has been met); see also TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT,
supra note 35, at 26569.
240. See Jed Rubenfeld, Privacy’s End, in LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 207,
21518 (H. Jefferson Powell & James Boyd White eds., 2009) (making a similar argument for the
autonomy-enhancing advantages of individualized suspicion).
241. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
242. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS xiiixvi, 4, 5457, 8284, 101, 10607 (2002)
(procedural justice and resulting enhanced governmental legitimacy both contribute to “acceptance,”
that is, to voluntary obedience to law); Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the
Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153 (2002) (summarizing empirical data demonstrating
that people are likely to readily bow to police officer “requests” to consent to a search).
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sound system of criminal justice would presumptively compel the officer to do
so.243 If, however, a citizen has sound reason to believe that he is stopped for
what category of person he isa generalization, such as one based on race,
ethnicity, or style of speech or dressrather than for what he has done, he will
lose any sense that he ever had serious control over the risk of facing police
interference in his life.244 Nor will he believe that he has any voice concerning
the price he must pay. The price he pays for social stability will, therefore, no
longer seem fair.245
b. Transparency. “Transparency” means that the price-setting process is
open, rational, and understandable.246 Ideally, that openness would precede or
coincide with payment of the price.247 But even delayed transparency is better
than none.248 By linking individualized suspicion to publicly open and available
remedies, the law ensures that the searched or seized citizen will receive at least
a delayed, and sometimes a coinciding, explanation for police action. Thus, if
police execute a search warrant, local rules and practices generally require that
the subject of the search be served a copy of the warrant and the supporting
affidavitwhich sets forth the reasons for suspecting the individualat the
time of the search.249 Moreover, whether or not this occurs, the person searched
can later obtain the affidavit if accused of a crime or if bringing civil suit against

243. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 242, at 70, 202 (explaining that understanding why police
officers act as they do promotes motive-based trust, and that stop-and-frisks are perceived as fair when
officers give credible reasons for their actions and avoid demeaning the person stopped).
244. See id. at 85–86, 163.
245. See Tom R. Tyler, Racial Profiling, Attributions of Motive, and the Acceptance of Social
Authority, in SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN LEGAL DECISIONMAKING: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
6466, 7071 (Richard L. Wiener et al. eds., 2007) (policing decisions seen as unfair because they lack
neutrality, consistency, factuality, or dignity, increasing disobedience to law and cooperation with the
police).
246. See MAXWELL, supra note 211, at 7778.
247. See id.
248. Transparency’s benefits extend beyond promoting perceptions of procedural justice, as law
professor David Harris explains:
Without transparencyinstitutional openness to public scrutinyreal accountability cannot
exist, and the lifeblood of transparency is the wide dissemination of information. A
government agency that functions in the shadows, without public oversight, is an open
invitation for abuse. The more crucial the agency’s mission and the greater its powers, the
graver the danger posed by a lack of transparency. Police departments have always resisted
this idea, but what will probably most surprise those who work in policing is that
disseminating information about their performance can benefit themin very substantial
ways.
HARRIS, supra note 160, at 11819. The benefits for the police include error reduction and enhanced
community cooperation. See id. at 11920; see also Taslitz, supra note 189, at 28494 (explaining how
transparency promotes a more “honor-based” police organizational culture); Taslitz, supra note 188, at
284 (explaining that transparency is a prerequisite to accountability); see generally Erik Luna,
Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2000) (extolling the virtues of widespread police
transparency).
249. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
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the police.250 Affidavits are usually written by the police themselves, less often
by prosecutors, in ways that may be readily understandable to many, if not
necessarily most, laypeople.251 In a criminal case, the right to counsel also
ensures the availability of a lawyer to explain the affidavit’s meaning.252
Furthermore, even for warrantless searches and seizures (indeed, for all
searches and seizures) in criminal cases, the availability of the suppression
hearing, at which the officer’s testimony is taken, requires the state to explain
its actions.253 Lawyers again stand ready via cross-examination to prod evasive
or ambiguous witnesses into clarifying matters.254 Transparency similarly
promotes accountability because officers and the state face consequences if the
reasons they give are poor or perjurious.255
c. Impartiality. “Impartiality” is the idea that the process of decision
should be impersonal and unbiased.256 A related, though not identical, idea is
that persons expect decisionmakers, even when they have the power to inflict
punishment on the persons before them, to act with care and concern for those
persons, at least in the sense of treating them in a respectful manner, showing
concern for their rights, and being committed to making an accurate decision,
reached fairly.257 That expectation likewise includes the sense of entitlement to
an honest, factual, evidence-based procedure and outcome.258
The objective nature of the probable-cause or reasonable-suspicion decision
turns on what a “reasonable” police officer has a right to believe.259 Surely, no
court would openly describe as “reasonable” an officer’s beliefs that are based
on bias toward a particular group, a venal desire to harm members of that
group, or a complete lack of serious or apparently accurate evidence linking the

250. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, 41.
251. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 23738 (explaining the warrant application
process); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a) (declaring that a law-enforcement officer or the attorney for the
government are authorized to prepare a warrant affidavit).
252. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies at all “critical stages” after formal adversarial
proceedings have begun. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 869, 88587 (supporting
this proposition and illustrating the active role defense counsel can play at suppression hearings).
253. See id. at 226 (noting that for most suppression issues involving warrantless searches or
seizures, the prosecution has the burden of proof; failing to meet it with evidence and arguments results
in the prosecution’s losing the motion).
254. See id. at 75051 (illustrating the process of impeachment at suppression hearings).
255. Unconvincing reasons or incredible stories will lead to loss of the suppression motion, including
not only exclusion of the evidence wrongly seized but also likely to include any evidence obtained as
the poisonous “fruit” of that tainted constitutional tree. See id. at 226. Police lies under oath at such
hearings can result in perjury prosecutions. See Christopher Slobogin, Testifying: Police Perjury and
What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996).
256. See MAXWELL, supra note 211, at 7980.
257. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 242, at 58, 80, 83, 163.
258. See id. at 16263.
259. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 19495.
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specific individual stopped to a specific crime or attempt.260 Nor could an
officer’s beliefs about an individual’s past or impending behavior be deemed
“reasonable” if based on assumptions or conjecture.261 The individualizedsuspicion requirement, properly understood, thus helps to promote perceived
and actual police impartiality.
3. Distributive Fairness
Distributive fairness likewise has at least three core aspects: first, “equity”—
the idea that the price charged should reflect the worth of the product (you
should “get what you pay for”); second, “equality”—the notion that everyone
should be charged the same price; and third, “need”—the recognition that the
price should be adjusted for the disadvantaged.262 These three aspects of
distributive fairness are, however, closely related.
a. Equity. In the criminal-justice system, equity means in part that the
price each citizen pays for the safety of her person or property must be worth
the resulting benefit in crime reduction.263 Yet there is reason to believe that
undue reliance on generalizations will often increase, rather than decrease,
crime.
Take a simple example. Suppose that the police correctly believe that a
group of persons with characteristic A is more likely than those with
characteristic B to commit a certain class of serious crime.264 Accordingly, police
start investigating, stopping, and arresting mostly As. In a static, unchanging
world, that approach would reduce serious crime. But in the real, dynamic
world, Bs may learn that police are focusing their resources primarily, or even
entirely, on As. Bs will no longer fear police capture, thus becoming more
willing to engage in the serious criminal activity from which they previously
260. On the other hand, while not labeling such actions and motivations “reasonable”indeed
condemning them, as in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1415, 22 (1968)the Court has held that officers’
subjective motivations are irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness question. See TASLITZ,
PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 47678; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). But see
Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998) (condemning the
Court’s reasoning in Whren and explaining how officer motivations can fit into an “objective” inquiry).
Still, the Court is likely to view, at least in its public pronouncements, “reasonable” officer beliefs or
actions as those informed by the evidence fairly evaluated by an officer untainted by racial hatred or
stereotypes—in short, to embrace the ideal of officer impartiality.
261. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 196200 (probable cause and reasonable
suspicion must be based on trustworthy evidence rather than on speculation or unarticulated hunches).
My argument here, of course, turns on both the existence of an individualized-suspicion mandate and
the availability of a serious remedy for that mandate, matters determined in a public proceeding. I
accordingly see the individualized-suspicion concept’s social value as inseparably linked to the
availability of remedies via sound adjudicative processes. To gut the remedies or their related processes
is thus to simultaneously gut individualized suspicion of much of its meaning and value.
262. See MAXWELL, supra note 211, at 7374.
263. See id.
264. This example is a variation on examples, rooted in empirical data and social and economic
theory, in BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING
IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 2226, 12939 (2007).
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refrained. If there are equal numbers of As and Bs in a society, and if Bs now
start committing this class of serious crime at a higher rate than did As, then the
total serious crime in society rises.
Alternatively, if the Bs’ new rate of serious criminality is equal to or
somewhat smaller than the As’ previous rate but Bs are a significantly larger
group than As, then the total crime in society will again rise. Of course, by
police’s focusing on As, perhaps even imprisoning them, incapacitation effects
might reduce the rate at which As commit serious crime. Whether public safety
benefits overall turns partly on whether the total fall in absolute numbers of this
crime committed by As exceeds the total rise in absolute numbers of this crime
committed by Bs. Another aspect of this cost-benefit reasoning is whether the
enormous added costs in building prisons, supervising parolees, and addressing
recidivists whose long incarceration has made it hard for them to function in the
free world are worth the benefits. There is strong reason to believe that they are
not265especially because alternative methods of crime prevention may very
well have done better in cost-benefit terms than has mass incapacitation.266
The general characteristics most likely to affect arrest and search rates are
race and class.267 Assume, therefore, that the As are African Americans with low
incomes and the Bs are Whites with at least modestly higher incomes. The

265.
[T]he ordinary incapacitation effects are likely to be relatively small. Generally, they will be
washed out by the effect of any change in offending: there is no incapacitation effect if you
imprison a recidivist versus an ordinary citizen once the rates of offending have equalized. But
what if the offending rates do not equalize? What if offenders are entirely irrational and
completely unresponsive to policing?
Id. at 28.
266. See id. at 2728 (suggesting that the resources spent on mass incarceration could have been
“better spent on other crime-fighting practices, such as increased police presence, more drug-treatment
programs, free abortions, mandatory military conscription, or other policies”).
267. A recent report on quality-of-life policing in New York City made this point starkly:
The most recent NYPD data confirms that the police disproportionately target New Yorkers
of color for stops and frisks. In 2006 alone, the NYPD stopped, questioned, or frisked over
508,540 people, a 500% percent increase over the previous year. Over 80% of those stopped
and frisked were Black or Latino (or Latina), even though these groups make up only 53.6%
of the NYC population. Only 10% of stops led to summonses or arrests, thereby undermining
any claim that racial disparities in stops and frisks are the result of differential rates of
involvement in criminal activity rather than race-based policing practices. The numbers of
stops are increasing, as well.
Marc Krupanski, Andrea Ritchie, Justice Committee & People’s Justice, Backgrounder on Racial
Profiling and Police Brutality Against People of Color in New York City Prepared for the Special
Rapporteur on Racism on the Occasion of His 2008 Mission to the US, available at http://
ccrjustice.org/files/2008%20Report%20on%20NYPD%20Racial%20Profiling%20&%20Brutality%20t
o%20UN%20SR%20on%20Racism.pdf (2008). The Rand Committee Corporation, relying on data in
the NYPD’s electronic database that is not available to the public, reached even bleaker conclusions,
finding that 89% of persons stopped by police in 2006 were people of color. Once stopped, 45% of
Blacks or Latino (or Latina) suspects were frisked, compared to only 29% of Whites, even though
Whites were 70% more likely than Blacks to carry a weapon. See Greg Ridgeway, Analysis of Racial
Disparities in the New York Police Department’s Stop, Question, and Frisk Practices, RAND
Corporation (2007).
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higher rates of criminality among these African Americans may stem from real
or perceived limitations on their job, educational, and other life prospects and
on their geographic mobility.268 If that is so, their rate of crime-commission will
be relatively inelastic, meaning it will decline little, if at all, even in the face of
increased police commitment of resources to capturing African Americans.
On the other hand, Whites may have resisted crime at an assumed starting
point at which they faced the same risk of capture as African Americans
precisely because the Whites had greater real or perceived life opportunities
relative to Blacks. Under the new regime of profiling Blacks, this last
observation, when combined with the new, almost certain freedom of Whites
from being identified and punished, suggests a comparatively elastic white
offending rate,269 meaning a much greater increase in white offending rates from
a sharp decline in detection relative to the decline in black offending rates from
racial profiling. Moreover, Whites, even those on the lower end of the income
scale, are still a much larger group than Blacks.270
Accordingly, it is likely that racial generalizations will increase the absolute
amount of serious white crime more than it will decrease that of serious black
crime. From both the black perspective and the overall societal perspective, the
use of race-based generalizations is inequitable because the price paid by
Blacks’ being stopped (most of whom will still be innocent) and arrested, when
guilty, will increase rather than decrease crime. The price being paid in
diminished liberties is, therefore, not worth the benefits.
b. Inequality. Inequality effects can simultaneously magnify the
inequitable nature of generalized race-based (even partly or completely
subconsciously race-based) policing. Professor Bernard Harcourt makes this

268. See HARCOURT, supra note 264, at 24 (“Whether the different offending rates are due to
different socioeconomic backgrounds, to different histories, cultures, or [to] education, nonspurious
profiling rests on the accurate assumption that members of one group offend more than those of
another, holding everything else constant.”).
269. It is important to stress the importance of comparative inelasticities. If rates of crime reduction
(elasticity relative to policing) for Blacks are lower than those for Whites, all else being equal, then
stopping more Blacks but fewer Whites raises overall crime. See id. at 2324. But this example assumes
that, before profiling, black crime rates were indeed higher than white rates, for, without that
assumption, profiling rests on a spurious association. Yet, argues Harcourt, if poor Blacks at the
starting point offend more “because they are socioeconomically more disadvantaged, then it would
follow logically that they may also have less elasticity of offending to policing because they have fewer
alternative job opportunities.” Id. at 24. This is sound, informed speculation, but we currently have no
hard data, “no good idea how the elasticities compare.” Id. But, insists Harcourt, given informed
speculation to the contrary and the high potential individual and social costs of race-based (or other
group-based) searches and seizures, there is “no good reason” to assume alternative elasticities and
absolute numbers in which profiling is more beneficial than harmful to society as a wholeand this is
true even if police initially seem to achieve higher “hit rates” for evidence of criminality by instituting
profiling. See id. at 24, 12324.
270. See id. at 24 (“Because of the different elasticities and the fact that the profiled are usually small
minorities, the raw increase in offending among the nonprofiled group will be greater numerically than
the raw decrease in offending of the profiled group.”) (emphasis added).
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point by examining the “ratchet effect.” 271 He explains this effect by using a
fishing analogy.272 Suppose that the Mediterranean Sea is filled with bass, but
the Atlantic Ocean is sparsely populated by salt-water trout. Fishermen
focusing mostly on the Atlantic will have a much smaller catch than those
focusing more on the Mediterranean for the same effort. Accordingly,
fishermen will eventually move toward fishing only in the Mediterranean, thus
catching only bass. The number of bass might, however, diminish over time
from all the heavy fishing in the Mediterranean, while the number of trout in
the Atlantic might start to rise because no fishermen prowl there for aquatic
prey. Yet the dead hand of history, showing fishermen’s relative successes and
failures between fishing in one body of water versus the other, will at least slow,
and may entirely prevent, the fishermen from recognizing the likely change in
relative fish populations. If that change is sufficiently great, the fishermen might
now improve their overall catch, at least temporarily, by returning to their
earlier fishing patterns. Yet they fail to recognize this new reality.
If Blacks are bass and Whites are trout, and if we add in the relative
inelasticity of Blacks, but relative elasticity of Whites to capture rates discussed
above, here is what happens: Police (the fishermen) focus more of their search
efforts on poor black neighborhoods, fewer on white ones. Police notice a high
“success rate” in this strategy, thus, like the fishermen, eventually devoting
nearly all resources in trawling black rather than white neighborhoods, taking
every successful arrest as an indication of the strategy’s wisdom. But black
crime rates stay the same or fall just at the moment when white crime rates and
absolute offending levels rise. Police are thus focusing their long-term efforts in
the wrong place. Overall crime likely increases from this misappropriation of
resources alone but, even if it does not, the black community as a whole and its
individual members will rightly perceive that they are charged a higher price in
lost liberties to attain purported safety than are Whites. Moreover, the greater
relative poverty and limited life opportunities of Blacks relative to Whites
violates the “need” principle of distributive justicethe idea that the
disadvantaged should pay lower, not higher, prices for the same services.273
Yet violations of these inequality and need principles have feedback effects
on real and perceived lack of equity. As discussed earlier, substantial social
science demonstrates that denial of procedural and distributive justice likely has
at least two ill effects.274 Notably, those perceiving themselves as unfairly treated
271. See id. at 147.
272. See id. at 14748. This example is altered slightly for clarity and to use a more savory species of
fish.
273. See MAXWELL, supra note 211, at 74.
274. Procedural justice is generally the far more significant contributor to decision acceptance than
is distributive justice. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 242, at 5051, 5457. Nevertheless, distributive
justice also promotes outcome acceptance. See id. Perhaps more importantly, in the law-enforcement
context, it is hard to separate out these effects in a practical way, even if their relative contributions can
be analyzed statistically. This is so because, for example, the same police behaviorhere, racial
profilingcan lead to both unfair distributive justice and unfair procedural justice or motive-based
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are more likely to disobey the law again in the future.275 Perceptions of injustice
or unfairness thus increase actual crime rates.276 Furthermore, communities
perceiving their members as ill-treated by the justice system reduce their
cooperation with the police in deterring and prosecuting crime.277 By thus
reducing police detection and justice-system punishment rates, fewer of the
guilty pay a deserved price for their misconduct, and crime rates may further
rise as the guilty see capture and punishment as less likely. At the same time,
racially skewed policing practices amplify the public association between
blackness and crime, thus further limiting Blacks’ life chances, as many studies,
including those concerning employment discrimination, have shown.278 But such
life-opportunity limitations are further likely to increase black crime rates.279
c. Spuriousness. Note that the entire discussion above assumed the
accuracythe nonspurious natureof the generalizations that police make
when initially deciding to rely upon them. But what if these generalizations are
spurious? In that case, all the effects just recounted should be far greater. In
particular, an increasing percentage of Blacks stopped will be entirely innocent.
Stopping the innocent in itself violates deeply rooted perceptions of fairness,
apart from concerns about inequality. Two justice-perception researchers put it
like this:
People are interested in the message the process used to handle their problem
communicates about their standing as full participants in the society. People want to
believe that third parties care about their concerns, consider their arguments, and try
280
to be fair to them—symbols of particularistic attention.

trust perceptions, as illustrated above. Moreover, this problem shows why I often prefer the lens of the
fair-price-theory economist to the justice psychologist, though they are both close cousins. The
economist views equity not simply in terms of favorable outcomes or their distribution but also as
getting a good enough outcome for the price paid. See supra notes 26262 and accompanying text. The
higher civil-liberties price paid by profiled groups must be weighed against the relative benefits they
receive from the new style of policing, benefits likely to be seen by them as small, especially given their
frequent preference for community-based healing approaches (“restorative justice”) over more
militaristic, retributive approaches to the problem of crime. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Fourth Amendment
Federalism and the Political Silencing of the American Poor, 85 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 277, 29395
(2010). Finally, the policing context seems to me one in which resentments at any sort of injustice are
often likely to run high.
275. See Tom R. Tyler, Afterword, in TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 269, 26988
(new afterword ed., 2006).
276. See id.
277. See id.; see generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE,
UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY POLICING: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION (1994); DAVID A. HARRIS,
PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 11728 (2002) (discussing the
damage to minority-group trust and willingness to cooperate with the police and to the criminal-justice
system’s perceived legitimacy); David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Revisited: “Just Common Sense in the
Fight Against Terror,” 17 CRIM. JUST. MAGAZINE 3641, 59 (2002) (summarizing empirical data).
278. See Taslitz, supra note 208, at 111821 (discussing the “bystander effects”).
279. See id.
280. Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN
LAW 84 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001) (emphasis added).
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This observation suggests that part of the benefit of procedural and
distributive justice is to convey the sense of particularistic attention to each
individual’s qualities and behavior. But this is precisely one of the purposes of
the individualized-suspicion requirement in probable-cause and reasonablesuspicion determinations.281 If minoritiesindeed if anyoneperceive that they
have been reasonably treated in a particularistic fashion, they are more likely to
accept policing error in the name of some greater good.282
This discussion might leave the impression that eliminating race-based
generalities alone, rather than other sorts of generalities, would be sufficient to
address procedural and distributive fairness concerns. Race certainly provides
the starkest example of the problem of overgeneralization. But the problems
recounted here occur with many other generalizations as well.283 The problem is
not merely with race but with the generalization process itself.284
d. Retribution. Finally, the denial of procedural and substantive justice
sparks a desire for retribution.285 This desire is strongest when social rather than
personal unfairness is incurred. Personal unfairness occurs when one person or
process violates another person’s hopes or expectations; but social unfairness
occurs when prescriptive norms of how persons or institutions should
behavenorms that society as a whole embraces as defining right and
wrongare violated.286 Most of the discussion above concerns violation of just
these prescriptive social norms. Such violations communicate the message that
the offended individual is not worthy of the protections that shield the rest of
the community.287 That individual’s sense of insult may be magnified if she
perceives it as extending as well to a group with whom she strongly identifies.288
Under such circumstances, the group as a whole may likewise take offense from
the harm done to the individual.289 The individual and the group seek societal
punishment of the wrongdoerhere, individual police or a police unit or
department as a wholeto send the unequivocal message that offender and
offended are of equal value, thus entitled to equal protection of social-fairness
norms.290
If courts or other governmental bodies do not provide the necessary
retribution, offended individuals and groups will do so themselves. As a

281. See supra text accompanying notes 34, 4950.
282. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 280, at 84 (noting that “particularistic attention” is central to
procedural justice).
283. See HARCOURT, supra note 264, at 21523.
284. See id. at 21517.
285. For a more extensive analysis of the concept of retributive justice, see Andrew E. Taslitz, The
Inadequacies of Civil Society: Law’s Complementary Role in Regulating Harmful Speech, 1 MARGINS
305 (2001).
286. See MAXWELL, supra note 211, at 75.
287. See Taslitz, supra note 199, at 5058.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See Taslitz, supra note 285, at 31322, 33839.
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practical matter, this may ordinarily be done by shunning (not cooperating with
the police) or by complaint.291 But if these actions fail to elicit a firm government
response or are insufficient to invoke outrage over a particularly egregious
abuse or longstanding pattern of abuses, retributive anger will not be sated. In
such instances, that anger can explode in community protests, aggressive
resistance to policing, or even the violence of riots.292 In this way too, therefore,
the individualized-suspicion requirement promotes social stability and physical
safety.
B. Privacy and Its Cousins
1. Respect and Privacy Defined and Linked to Individualized Suspicion
Respect as fittingness is the idea that each person is entitled to be treated in
accordance with his status concerning some specified attribute.293 Any lesser
treatment is insulting. Human-rights theorists debate what attribute of sameness
all humans share. To some theorists it is being made in the image of God, to
others it is the capacity to achieve moral goodness, and to still others it is
rationality and autonomyhumans’ nature as self-directing beings legislating
their own life plans.294 Whatever the quality we all share, that quality entails
certain rights or entitlements without which our status as humans is ignored.295
Freedom of conscience, privacy, the right to own property earned by the sweat
of the brow, and freedom of movement are among the rights commonly deemed
to belong to every person simply by nature of her humanity.296 Furthermore,
many “fittingness theorists” agree that these sorts of entitlements necessarily

291. See supra text accompanying notes 27676 (noting reduced citizen willingness to cooperate
with the police, a form of “exit” from unfair or ineffective institutions); HIRSCHMAN, supra note 232
(explaining when participants in institutions choose “voice” (that is, complaint) over exit as a strategy
for seeking correction of those institutions’ flaws).
292. See Taslitz, supra note 189, at 24448.
293. See GEOFFREY CUPIT, JUSTICE AS FITTINGNESS 12, 15–28 (1996) (describing “respect” and
“justice” as part of the same family of concepts, with respect being the broader idea).
294. See JOHN E. COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL: THE ANATOMY OF A
WESTERN INSIGHT 13, 11622 (1999) (contrasting moral goodness); see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE
IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 1141 (1998) (arguing that the idea of human rights is
“ineliminably religious”); WILLIAM F. SCHULTZ, IN OUR OWN BEST INTEREST: HOW DEFENDING
HUMAN RIGHTS BENEFITS US ALL 1731 (2001) (offering pragmatic arguments for accepting the ideas
of human rights and equality).
295. See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1697 (1992).
296. See, e.g., JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
ORIGINS, DRAFTING, & INTENT 1356, 7375 (1999) (recognizing privacy, property, and free
movement as universal rights); cf. Martha Minow, Equality and the Bill of Rights, in THE
CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 118, 11828 (Michael J.
Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992) (discussing how human dignity and equality are embraced in
the Bill of Rights, especially in the protections of the First Amendment).
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imply diversity in life choices.297 Respect must therefore be shown for the sorts
of differences that are central to personal identity.298 Respect thus requires an
appreciation of diversity and uniqueness among sameness. Disrespect,
correspondingly, consists of treating another in a manner reasonably
understood as inconsistent with equally valuing that other for both the salient
ways in which she is like us and the ways in which she is legitimately different
from us.
Privacy, properly understood, is part of what defines us as, and enables us to
be, unique. Human beings are complex, wearing different masks in different
situations.299 We may, for example, be punctual at work but tardy to parties.300
No single mask is inauthentic; each represents an aspect of ourselves.301
Moreover, we value each mask for three reasons. First, it takes time to get to
know a person in all his or her fullness, so each of us fears being misjudged by
others if they see only a part of us, particularly if it is a part about which we fear
they will disapprove.302 Second, controlling what aspects of our nature we let
certain persons see allows us to develop other aspects of our personalitiesour
on-average way of thinking and behavingfree of their gaze, thus free of
pressures toward conformity.303 That freedom, in turn, allows us to pursue our
own unique interests, learning and doing what we want, how we want, within
broad limits.304 Third, because only time and the slow development of trust allow
297. “Fittingness” is an idea that captures an underlying similarity among theorists writing about
respect, dignity, insult, and humiliation. See CUPIT, supra note 293, at 24, 1323, 4648, 6063, 92. I
thus refer to them all as “fittingness theorists.” On the importance of diversity in life choices, see Jean
Hampton, Retribution and the Liberal State, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 117, 14041 (1994)
(defending a “perfectionist liberalism” in which the state must promote “value pluralism,” so that
citizens have plenty of options and opportunities to choose from in creating their lives).
298. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the Critics of Hate Crimes
Legislation Are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. REV. 739, 74665 (1999) (making similar point); see also AVISHAI
MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 13538, 14042, 153, 15861 (1996). Margalit is what I call a
“negative” fittingness theorist, focusing on what conduct we must avoid if we do not wish to insult
others. See id. at 9, 112, 115, 137. Cupit is a “positive” fittingness theorist, focusing on what conduct
entitles us to receive respect. See CUPIT, supra note 293, at 24, 6, 1518, n.10.
299. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology,
Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 152 (Spring 2002).
300. See id. at 153.
301. See id.; JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA 89, 12, 21819 (2000) (originating the “mask” terminology).
302. See Taslitz, supra note 299, at 15355.
303. See id. at 155, 158. As law professor Lawrence Lessig puts it,
We all deserve to live in separate communities. Privacy, or the ability to control data about
yourself, supports this desire. It enables these multiple communities and disables the power of
one dominant community to norm others into oblivion. Think, for example, about a gay man
in an intolerant small town.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 15253 (1999). On the definition of
“personality,” see Taslitz, supra note 5, at 3134.
304. See PATRICIA BOLING, PRIVACY AND THE POLITICS OF THE INTIMATE LIFE 79 (1996) (“A
third reason to respect the individual’s privacy about intimate-life decisions has to do with the need to
value and respect diversity. Scrutinizing an individual’s intimate practices and demanding conformity to
an implicit standard promotes homogeneity and undercuts and devalues differences. Assuming an
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us to reveal increasingly more of ourselves to another, we define the nature and
degree of intimacy we have with particular others by the degree to which we
reveal information about ourselves to them and by the content of such
revelation.305
Privacy is thus the creation of metaphorical boundaries that protect us
against the risk of being misdefined and judged out of context.306 Privacy is
therefore one way by which we express our need for individualized justice: for
being judged for who we really are.307 Yet privacy also gives us the freedom to
choose who we are, to follow our own paths in a way that gives life meaning and
permits the development of life-enhancing human relationships and human
autonomy. Moreover, because privacy enables us to develop and define our
sense of self, we experience invasions of privacy as assaults on our identity.308
Privacy protects self-definition by giving each of us some control over important
information about ourselves, so it is the loss of control, rather than revelation
itself, that wounds us.
John Stuart Mill long ago wrote of the importance of being freed from
“social tyranny,” the “tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling,” which can
be “more formidable than many kinds of political oppression” because society
itself becomes the tyrant.309 Said Mill, this sort of social tyranny “maim[s] by
compression, like a Chinese lady’s foot, every part of human nature that stands
out.”310
Privacy theorist and law professor Jed Rubenfeld cautions, however, that a
focus solely on privacy in the Fourth Amendment context unduly restricts that
Amendment’s scope.311 Notably, he argues, freedom of movement is also
necessary to developing individual uniqueness.312 If we cannot visit the friends,

essentialized identity based on intimate affiliations or decisions likewise renders the diversity of
people’s experiences invisible and places normalizing pressure on different or dissenting group
members.”). See generally JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND
THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 66 (1997) (stating that privacy marks a zone of interests beyond the
legitimate concerns of others to protect against pressures to conform or to reveal one’s vulnerabilities);
FERDINAND DAVID SCHOEMAN, PRIVACY AND SOCIAL FREEDOM (1992) (asserting that freedom
from scrutiny and judgment permits us to talk, think, and act in ways that express our unique individual
identities).
305. See, e.g., ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 52
(1987) (“[T]he exercise of privacy-promoting liberties enhances persons and personal relationships in
ways that cannot be ignored by those who feel ethically constrained to treat persons as more than
things.”); see also ROSEN, supra note 301, at 8 (discussing how control over which masks we reveal
promotes intimate relationships).
306. See ROSEN, supra note 301, at 8.
307. See Taslitz, supra note 5, at 2430 (defining individualized justice); Taslitz, supra note 298, at
74658 (elaborating on the meaning and significance of individualized justice).
308. See Taslitz, supra note 299, at 155, 17071.
309. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13, 129 (1859; photo reprint, 2002).
310. See id. at 13, 129.
311. See Rubenfeld, supra note 240, at 207, 20911.
312. See id. at 211; cf. Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right to Locomotion: The Fourth
Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1990).
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neighbors, social or political groups, movies, or libraries we choose without
being accosted, that too hampers our ability to make choices, ponder ideas,
experience emotions, and exchange information and arguments free from the
state’s judgment.313 Furthermore, argues Rubenfeld, privacy’s development in
the Fourth Amendment sphere should be more robust than in the sphere of our
everyday lives because that Amendment creates a distinctive body of law
governing those who enforce the law, primarily the police.314 The Amendment,
he maintains, must be seen as distinctive because of the government’s
qualitatively and quantitatively unique and massive ability to intrude, monitor,
punish, and regulate individuals’ lives relative to the private sector.315 The
Amendment is also distinctive, however, because it grants the government both
a right and a duty to intrude into individuals’ private livescommitting acts
that would ordinarily constitute thefts, criminal trespasses, or assaultsthat
private persons lack.316 Rubenfeld thus prefers the broader term “personal life”
to the narrower term “privacy” to describe the extent of the intrusion.317
I would add to Rubenfeld’s point about the Fourth Amendment’s
distinctiveness its communicative, if not necessarily logical, link to the criminaljustice system. That system is the ultimate judge.318 The material consequences
of that judgment, such as imprisonment or death, are far more consequential
than those imposed by private parties.319 Conviction, or even arrest, can diminish
future job consequences, kill marriages, strain family ties, leave children
temporarily or permanently abandoned, friends lost.320 Furthermore, conviction
in modern American society marks the convicted as an outsider to the political
community, a lesser citizen in fact if not formally so in law.321
Moreover, the condemnation represented by a conviction is far more
extensive than, and of a different nature from, that stemming from lesser
wrongs. It is one thing to be blamed by one’s spouse, children, friends, or even
one’s church or neighborhood for letting them down. It is another thing to also

313. See Rubenfeld, supra note 240, at 22021.
314. See id. at 21214.
315. See id. at 214.
316. See id.
317. See id. at 20809. Rubenfeld develops his idea of personal life at greater length in Jed
Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101 (2008).
318. See Taslitz, supra note 285, at 31355 (comparing the social roles of the civil and criminaljustice systems and concluding that the latter is the ultimate assessor of culpability).
319. See RICHARD G. SINGER, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE II: FROM BAIL TO JAIL 255300 (2005)
(summarizing the sentencing options available in the criminal-justice system).
320. See generally INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (outlining the harms done to the
defendant, his family, friends, neighborhood, and society at large that were not part of his announced
sentence, but necessarily accompany it).
321. See Taslitz, supra note 285, at 356 (“The exclusion of the offender from being a full member of
the moral–political community (literal exclusion as well, in the case of imprisonment) has a powerful
impact in reaffirming social norms.”).
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be entirely blamed by the entire political community, yet that is just what a
criminal conviction represents.322
So powerful is the condemnatory message of the criminal-justice system that
any involvement with it, even well short of conviction, carries a taint. To be
arrested, even to be stopped and questioned, absent various Fourth
Amendment safeguards, is to risk humiliation and insult, certainly to fear those
consequences—or worse.323
The individualized-suspicion requirement protects the uniqueness-fostering
function of privacyor, if you prefer, of “personal life”in several ways.
Importantly, police need a significant level of justification for intruding upon
privacy.324 They may not do so on mere conjecture. Moreover, that justification
for intrusion must itself respect the individual’s uniqueness, for individualized
suspicion must be based on the individual’s actions and behavior.325
Furthermore, those actions and the self-revelation they involve are generally
freely chosennot the result of state compulsion or demandthus respecting
the individual’s autonomy.326 Additionally, individualized suspicion may not be
assumed or guessed at but rather must result from reliance on a sufficient
quality and quantity of evidence to support a reasonable and articulable
concern about past or impending criminality by this person.327 This evidentiary
barrier is an independent element of procedural justice and an obstacle to tooready state incursions upon persons’ private worlds.328 Police do not objectively
manifest disrespect toward persons when police stop or search them based on
trustworthy evidence of their voluntary (in the sense that it is not state-coerced)
revelation of aspects of their selves that justify suspicion of their criminality.329

322. See id. at 31355 (defending this very point but also noting that tortious civil liability, unlike
criminal liability, is more about blame being placed by individuals than by the entire community).
323. See, e.g., Taslitz, supra note 199, at 3341 (examining the arrest of a mother in front of her two
children for the crime of driving without a seat belt); see also Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318
(2001) (setting forth and analyzing the facts that were the basis for the driving without a seatbelt
discussion above); cf. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349 (1997) (discussing the criminal law’s influence on social norms as well as law’s influence more
generally).
324. See supra text accompanying notes 57, 166, 303-07, 317.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 533, 50.
326. See Rubenfeld, supra note 240, at 21619, 221. For a dystopian vision of the impact of such
autonomy invasion taken to the extreme, see Andrew E. Taslitz, Privacy as Struggle, 44 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 501 (2007).
327. See supra text accompanying notes 56; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (requiring
reasonable suspicion to be based upon “specific and articulable” facts). Although the Court generally
uses the “specific and articulable” facts language in connection with “reasonable suspicion,” surely
those same requirementsbut in more robust formmust inhere in the more protective “probable
cause standard.”
328. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
132 (1988) (“To the extent that procedure includes provisions that assure that decisions will be based
on accurate information and on well-informed or expert opinion, procedural fairness will be
enhanced.”).
329. See, e.g., TASLITZ, supra note 4, at 258590\:
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Disrespect is, instead, fairly perceived when the police seem to be acting
without an adequate evidentiary basis or upon generalizations or surmise.330 In
such instances, the innocent man feels rightly robbed of the good reputation he
has striven to deserve. “Here the belief exists that the ‘not guilty’ should not be
punished. Pain and punishment [are] not warranted. In addition, here the
individual does the right thing, takes the right precautions, yet pain and
punishment strike anyway.”331 This concept is not a comparative one of
inequality but an absolute one of the “good” person “getting unfairly
punished”;332 and, as explained above, unjustified, nonindividualized stops by
police are indeed often rightly experienced (and always entitled to be
experienced) as akin to punishment, certainly as an infliction of psychic pain
rather than mere inconvenience.
2. The Drive To Be, and To Be Thought of, As Unique.
a. Cognitive modules and human uniqueness. The importance of being,
and being thought of as, unique cannot be overstated. It is likely rooted in
fundamental aspects of human psychology, though culture may also play a
role.333 Pulitzer Prize finalist Judith Rich Harris synthesized the recent work
being done on the human mind by both cognitive scientists and evolutionary
psychologists into a persuasive explanation of why each individual is indeed in
many ways unique, while also sharing so much with many others.334 To be sure,
Harris recognizes the impact of the usual suspects of individual heredity and the
environment in explaining human variation.335 However, she also finds other
powerful individual and social mechanisms at work by which each of us tries to
be like others in some ways, different from them in others. These mechanisms
are rooted in three systems or “modules” in the brain: the socialization,
relationship, and status modules.336

[A]ny unduly group-based suspicions risk treating people like fungible property rather than as
unique human beings, a form of treatment meant to die with slavery. On the other hand, the
Reconstruction Congress was as concerned with whites’ rights as blacks’. The black
experience under slavery underscores the value of the individualized-justice principle to
human dignity, but it is a principle that must be revitalized for all persons, regardless of race.
Id. at 259; cf. Taslitz, supra note 208, at 112145 (examining how flawed informants’ evidence at the
search-warrant stage can lead not only to wrongful arrests but to wrongful convictions).
330. See Taslitz, supra note 299, at 15874 (illustrating how group-based suspicion and reliance on
assumption over trustworthy evidence has limited the modern autonomy of gays, the poor, and racial
minorities, simultaneously insulting them all).
331. Norman J. Finkel, But It’s Not Fair!: Commonsense Notions of Unfairness, 6 PSYCH., PUB.
POL’Y, & L. 898, 910 (2000).
332. See id. at 91011.
333. See generally JUDITH RICH HARRIS, NO TWO ALIKE: HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN
INDIVIDUALITY (2006) (defending this proposition).
334. See id.
335. See id. at 2426, 4041.
336. See id. at 10662.

TASLITZ

Summer 2010]

12/22/2010 3:32:52 PM

WHAT IS PROBABLE CAUSE, AND WHY SHOULD WE CARE?

191

Briefly, the socialization module is the cognitive system that works to make
us more like those in our group.337 Humans have a strong need to belong to a
group, finding pleasure in solidarity and acceptance.338 Group membership can
also protect us from groups hostile to our own or from the vicissitudes and
isolation of a life lived alone.339 Part of each person’s sense of uniqueness indeed
comes from the particular intersection of his multiple group identities, for
example, as a young Jewish Northeastern heterosexual Democrat or a mature
Christian Southern gay Republican.340 The socialization system teaches us the
rules for being like others in our group.341
The relationship system, like the socialization system, likely had important
evolutionary advantages but of an almost opposite kind.342 Despite group
identification, there are important differences among individuals, or at least
among their relationships with one another.343 The relationship system allows us
to recognize one individual as physically distinct from another and then to
understand in as much depth as possible what makes that person’s character
unique.344 This second goal turns on our effectiveness as mind readers. If we can
better understand what makes another person tick differently, we can more
effectively judge how to relate to them, maximizing the benefits of interaction.345
Mind-reading aids us in determining whether another will help us if we are in
need, repay our favors, be a reliable trading partner, have sex with us, be a
trustworthy mate, like us or hate us, be gentle with us, or beat us up.346 The
relationship system, unlike the socialization system, is thus “a discriminator, not
a generalizera splitter, not a lumper.”347 Furthermore, among the distinctions
the system makes are those that give hints about each person’s relative

337. See id. at 19395, 206.
338. See TASLITZ, supra note 84, at 13435; ROY BAUMEISTER, THE CULTURAL ANIMAL: HUMAN
NATURE, MEANING, AND SOCIAL LIFE 377 (2005) (discussing the importance of group-belongingness);
DAVID BERREBY, US AND THEM: UNDERSTANDING YOUR TRIBAL MIND 16 (2005) (noting that
group affiliation is “an absolute requirement for being human”).
339. See BAUMEISTER, supra note 338, at 10709 (noting that belongingness promotes happiness,
mental and physical health, and that “[g]roups can share resources, care for sick members, scare off
predators, fight together against enemies, divide tasks so as to improve efficiency, and contribute to
survival in many other ways”); see also id. at 378 (“People may have evolved to recognize the presence
of an enemy group and to seek to form bonds and alliances for their own protection.”).
340. See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 180, at 23 (“[O]ur social identityour sense of who
we are and what we are worthis intimately bound up with our group memberships.”); see also
TASLITZ, supra note 84, at 135 (“Although all individuals are unique, some part of how we express
ourselves draws on group self-concepts . . . .”).
341. See HARRIS, supra note 312, at 19395.
342. See id. at 161.
343. See id. at 89 (explaining that, although we exaggerate the consistency in other people’s
behavior, individual differencescharacter traitsare real).
344. See id. at 16973.
345. See id. at 165, 17475; BERREBY, supra note 338, at 12325 (describing the importance of
gathering information about particular individuals over time to improve our ability to mind-read them).
346. See HARRIS, supra note 312, at 165.
347. Id. at 181.
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dominance and submissiveness and overall status within the group.348 This
information can be crucial in resolving, or even in avoiding, intra-group
conflict.349 Of course, “mind reading” is a best guess, but we are driven to do our
best to guess correctly, and those most often right likely had an evolutionary
advantage over others.350
The status system leads each of us to want to be better than, rather than
equal to or similar to, others, or at least to know where we stand in the status
hierarchy and how to move within it.351 Higher status is its own reward but also
brings easier access to more community resources.352 Status inheres in how most
other members of the community view you or would view you if they knew
you.353 Accordingly, judging our own status requires a special sort of mind
readingreading what status another assigns to us and why.354 Status is also
multidimensional and varies with context.355 For example, a lousy athlete has
low status on a baseball team. But the same person might have high status as a
journalist.356
How do these systems work in combination? Our relationship system drives
us to mind-read others, both to understand their unique qualities and to
determine what they see as our unique qualities. Nevertheless, our status system
also drives us to mind-read others to determine what they think about us, more
specifically, what status they on average assign us.357 Actual differences in
individuals’ talents may often initially be small. But the relationship system
drives others to focus on these differences, while the status system prods those
others to assign a status to us based on those perceived differences.358 If we
adequately understand how others judge us, we will seek to improve our status
accordingly. We do this by putting more effort into that which brings us higher
status, less effort into that which brings us the opposite.359 Similarly, we seek out
environments in which we can display our high-status talents, avoiding

348. See id.
349. See id. (“Obligations must be repaid, duplicity remembered, compatible companions sought
out, obnoxious ones avoided, those with higher status deferred to.”).
350. See id.
351. See id. at 209 (“To compete with one’s groupmates is to strive for status . . . .”); TASLITZ, supra
note 84, at 13437 (explaining that different groups have different social statuses, so the status of an
individual is inescapably also linked to the status of his group).
352. See TASLITZ, supra note 84, at 112.
353. See ALAIN DE BOTTON, STATUS ANXIETY viviii (2004).
354. See HARRIS, supra note 333, at 22426.
355. See id. at 212.
356. See id. at 226; ROBERT W. FULLER, ALL RISE: SOMEBODIES, NOBODIES, AND THE POLITICS
OF DIGNITY 15 (2006) (“But, unlike a chicken coop, modern human societies comprise thousands of
different hierarchies, and a person at the bottom of one may be at the top of another. The worst bowler
on the company team may be the CEO. The college dropout may be a billionaire.”).
357. See HARRIS, NO TWO ALIKE, supra note 333, at 221, 225.
358. See id. at 218.
359. See HARRIS, supra note 333, at 227, 239, 247.
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situations bringing us low status.360 Here I define “talents” broadly to include
personality traits as well as intellectual and physical skillsthe whole panoply
of potential human thoughts, emotions, and behavior.361
For example, if we are perceived as physically weak but admired for our
kindness, we might more often choose settings where kindness is valued and
work to emphasize what is kind about our behavior. To be sure, we could also
choose to go to the gym and bulk up, but our short stature and delicate frame
may make it hard for us to get much mileage out of this strategy, and it is, in any
event, easier for us to build on what we already see as our strengths. We might
have more ability to change other traits, such as being a poor dresser, provided
we have the money and a good source of sartorial advice.362 Our kind behavior
reinforces our self-image as kind, even at the subconscious level, as do the
rewards we receive in praise and self-satisfaction.363 Perceptions of our kind
nature can also open doors to us that otherwise might be closed where skilled
kindness is needed.364 Social-science research suggests that our efforts to stand
out for possessing a trait, such as kindness, tend to take root as longer-lasting
aspects of our character if they persist to about age sixteen.365 In this way the
best nurses and schoolteachers are born. Persons who find status in physical
strength and aggression, on the other hand, might become the sumo wrestlers
and other athletes of the future.
In sum, our relationship system drives us to be seen by others as unique,
while our status system drives us to see ourselves as, and to become, unique.
Although our relationship system drives us to seek commonalities with others,
those others are categorized into groups, and our particular combination of
group identities combines with the ways we strive for individual difference to
add to our uniqueness.366 Philosopher William James captured the strength of

360. See id. at 239 (declaring that the status system is social information that a person uses “to plot a
long-term strategy that will involve direct competition only in those areas of endeavor in which the
individual has a hope of succeeding”).
361. See id. at 21819, 23840, 247.
362. Cf. id. at 239 (emphasizing that individuals use status information to place themselves in
situations in which they believe they have the most hope of improving their status by improving their
actual or perceived performance).
363. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On Date Rape and Self-Deception, 28 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 381, 438 (2005).
364. Cf. KIERON O’HARA, TRUST: FROM SOCRATES TO SPIN 14 (2004) (“What does trust buy you?
It gets you out of a state of uncertainty . . . . [I]f someone has promised to help you, and you trust her,
then you can plan on that basis.”); see also PAUL SEABRIGHT, THE COMPANY OF STRANGERS: A
NATURAL HISTORY OF ECONOMIC LIFE 54 (2004) (“[Humans have evolved] through selection for
what is sometimes called ‘reciprocity,’ namely, an instinctive inclination to do unto others as they have
already done unto you. If others have treated you well, you treat them well in return, but if they have
hurt you, you hurt them back. An eye for an eye certainly, but also a gift for a gift.”).
365. See HARRIS, supra note 333, at 21819.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 34264. In addition to these forces, of course, genetic
tendencies, current environment, life experience, and happenstance all combine to make us uniquely
who we are. See HARRIS, supra note 333, at 23840, 247.

TASLITZ

194

12/22/2010 3:32:52 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 73:145

our need to be seen as, and to become, unique in these too-little-known but apt
words:
The first thing the intellect does with an object is to class it along with something else.
But any object that is infinitely important to us and awakens our devotion feels to us
also as if it must be sui generis and unique. Probably a crab would be filled with a
sense of personal outrage if it could hear us class it without ado or apology as a
crustacean, and thus dispose of it. “I am no such thing,” it would say; I am MYSELF,
367
MYSELF alone.

b. Storytelling theory. Another way to understand the uniqueness drive
is through the lens of storytelling theory. A person who is ten years old today
will, in twenty years, have different attitudes, beliefs, goals, and desires. He may
have fewer organs (missing, for example, a gall bladder), may be fatter or
thinner, more or less energetic. Even at the molecular level, the precise
molecules constituting his body will have changed. Yet he and others will still
think of him as the same person, as “Hank Jones” and not suddenly “Clay
Smith.”368
What explains this sense of individual continuity is the narrative coherence
of human lives. We each tell ourselves stories that link the different phases of
our lives.369 Our sense of self consists largely of these stories.370 “Our plannings,
our rememberings, even our loving and hating, are guided by narrative plots.”371
Narratives, of course, move through time, having a beginning, middle, and an
end.372 One cannot, therefore, be a person at a single moment in time.373 To be a
person is to be the combination of what you were, are, and will be.374 The
narrative nature of personhood does not make it a fiction. The narrative is who
you are.375
The hero (or antihero, depending upon the plot) of your own story is also its
author: you. Of course, there are common elements to many stories, including
367. See WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 2930 (1978) (based on
lectures delivered in Edinburgh 19011902).
368. See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELFGOVERNMENT 13142 (2001).
369. See Taslitz, A Feminist Approach, supra note 180, at 3436.
370. See id.; JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE 6389 (2002)
(discussing the narrative creation of the self).
371. See Theodore R. Sarbin, The Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Psychology, in NARRATIVE
PSYCHOLOGY: THE STORIED NATURE OF HUMAN CONDUCT 3, 11 (Theodore R. Sarbin ed., 1986).
372. See RUBENFELD, supra note 368, at 137; accord BRUNER, supra note 370, at 15 (“[W]e know
that narrative in all its forms is a dialectic between what was expected and what came to pass.”).
373. See RUBENFELD, supra note 368, at 137.
374. Id.
375. See id. Nor does this mean that the narrative can be based on fictions. Though our memories
are partly constructed, we do try to create a coherent sense of selfan interpretation of who we
arebased on our best beliefs about our own experiences as “out there” facts, such as whether we had
a dog as a child, what persons attended our Bar-Mitzvah, and what our grades were like in school. See
Taslitz, supra note 180, at 56, 1234 (distinguishing between “out there” facts and interpretive facts).
The same sort of analysis is true with “peoplehood”: it is defined by a narrative moving over time but is
not therefore a fiction. See RUBENFELD, supra note 368, at 4548, 13142, 14551.
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common types of plots.376 But even if this is so, to each individual, her own story,
and thus her own sense of self, is unique. Only she has experienced the events in
the story, no one else. Moreover, only her father, mother, sister, brother,
friends, employers, colleagues, and acquaintances play a role in the tale. She has
a unique relationship, a special history, with each such person. As the leading
advocates for understanding the role of individual and group storytelling in
macroeconomics put it, “[M]uch of human motivation comes from living
through a story of our lives, a story that we tell to ourselves and that creates a
framework for motivation.”377 Yet we also share chapters in that story with
others, much of human conversation consisting of the exchange of just such
stories.378
Being the authors of our own tales, and controlling how and when parts of it
unfold to others, are central aspects of human autonomy.379 When the state
treats an individual as but a stereotype, the state rewrites the individual’s story
and how it is told, robbing her of her autonomy. An individualized-suspicion
requirement minimizes this autonomy invasion, both by recognizing the
suspect’s authority to write much of her own tale (that is, judging her character,
motivations, and intentions by her voluntary words and actions) and by at least
respecting the defining aspect of her story: that she is indeed a unique
individual. Concerning seizures of the person, such as stops and full-blown
arrests, and relying on his idea of “personal life,” constitutional-law professor
Jed Rubenfeld captures part of the sense of injury to autonomy that comes from
the state’s unwarranted rewriting of the individual suspect’s tale:
Invasions of privacy are intrusions. Seizures are seclusions. They do not pry into the
detainee’s prior relationships or things. They take him away from his own life. Every
seizure has this effect to one degree or another. The more complete the victim’s
seclusion, the more complete his severance from the places and people he knew, the
more complete the destruction of his personal life. An imprisoned man loses his
380
liberty, of course, but he also loses his lifethe life he used to lead.

Indeed, continues Rubenfeld, to have a personal life by definition means to
have a part of one’s life not belonging to the public or the state. Yet, “[a]n
imprisoned man belongs to the state.”381 Indeed, “[h]is movements are not his
own. His time is not his own. His occupations will be directed by his custodians.
Seizures of the person attack the very existence of personal life.”382 But, as
Rubenfeld and other commentators have recognized elsewhere, albeit
sometimes in slightly different language, what makes a life “personal” to a

376. See RONALD B. TOBIAS, 20 MASTER PLOTS AND HOW TO BUILD THEM iiiiv (1993).
377. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY
DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 51 (2009).
378. See id.
379. Cf. TYLER COWEN, CREATE YOUR OWN ECONOMY: THE PATH TO PROSPERITY IN A
DISORDERED WORLD 3142 (2009) (discussing the economics of storytelling).
380. See Rubenfeld, supra note 240, at 220 (emphasis in original).
381. Id.
382. Id.
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particular individual is the tale he has constructed, his self-defining narrative.383
The state should rewrite that narrative gingerly and reluctantly, with full respect
for the distinctive voice of its author.
c. Mystery and awe. The appeal of the particular, especially in the
context of law, also has an emotional power that we cannot yet fully explain.384
Even when relying on a rulewhich is but one kind of generalizationthe
decisionmaker must craft a narrative from localized evidence to conclude that
the particular set of facts before her fits the terms of the rule.385 Engaging with
the particular can thus never be avoided. Choosing what aspects of the
particular to attend to and how to interpret them likewise requires a
combination of active concentration, focused intelligence, and informed
intuition.386
The rule of law, of course, requires rules, that is, generalizations. But rules
purport to “appropriate the mystery of the world by forcing each particular
under their aegis, denying its particularity.”387 Yet in practical decisionmaking
and to varying degrees, judges cannot in fact deny the particular. They must and
will engage with it.388 One way to undertake this task is candidly, recognizing the
necessary tension between the general and the particular, accepting the
unavoidable anxiety of struggling with that tension.389 Another is self-deception,
pretending that the rules or generalizations, not the appeal of the individual
case, dictate the outcome.390 Philosopher Zenon Bankowski thus describes rules
as a “cowardly way of decisionmaking.”391 The cowardice, he explains, stems
from the false perception “that I no longer have to make up my mind in the
encounter with the awesome mystery of the particular before me.”392 The
individualized-suspicion requirement chooses candor over cowardice.
Bankowski and his colleague, James MacLean, indeed see this sort of
candor as essential to justice. The two philosophers declare both formal and

383. See id. at 220; Taslitz, A Feminist Approach, supra note 180, at 1823, 3446.
384. See Zenon Bankowski, In the Judgment Space: The Judge and the Anxiety of the Encounter, in
THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR IN LEGAL REASONING 25, 2526 (Zenon Bankowski &
James MacLean eds., 2006).
385. See id. at 2728.
386. See id. at 3334.
387. Id. at 32.
388. See John Bell, The Institutional Constraints on Particularism, in THE UNIVERSAL AND THE
PARTICULAR IN LEGAL REASONING, supra note 384, at 43 (arguing that accountability in the context
of judicial reasoning requires a public statement demonstrating good reasons for a decision rooted in
case-specific particulars).
389. See Bankowski, supra note 384, at 2729, 33.
390. Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Call for a
Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. LEG. 329, 399401 (making a similar point concerning
interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence).
391. See Bankowski, supra note 384, at 32.
392. See id.
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substantive justice to be requirements of total justice.393 Formal justice aspires
toward equal treatment of likes under a regime of equal rules.394 But substantive
justice emphasizes using the values embodied in those rules to do justice in the
particular case.395 Reconciling the roles of the latter form of justice with the
former requires often treating rules as flexible guides, even sometimes
departing from the rules’ rigid application.396 Only doing so, these authors
explain, addresses the “real pain and hurt” of the particular case.397
Bankowski himself argues that any other approach disrespects the
“ontology, mystery, and beauty” of the particular.398 When applied to a person,
however, this idea of the mystery of the particular is more than an assertion of
an inarticulable attraction to the particular, more than a mere embrace of it on
aesthetic grounds. Rather, it is a way of expressing awe at the infinite value of
the individual as unique and irreplaceable, no matter what wrongs he has
donean idea, a value deeply rooted in Judeo-Christian teaching.399 So viewed,
Bankowski’s language of mystery and awe can be seen as an expression of
respect for a deeply rooted American value. In this light, Bankowski’s words
can be read as encapsulating the prayerful worship of the individual that
underlies American justice:
[T]hat you, I, a flower, or any part of the world exists is a mystery. Here then is
something that I cannot completely grasp or understand. It is that which gives it its
beauty, the fact that it will always be something beyond me. It is this integrity that I
400
must respect and stand in awe of.

Individualized suspicion is the law’s expression of that awe. It is a way of
educating law enforcement that our society values the individual for herself, a
reminder to grant her some minimal measure of respect no matter what we
suspect she has done.
d. Political diversity. Earlier, I discussed the benefits for the individual of
the drive toward developing a unique personality. But promoting human
uniqueness, thus human diversity, has broader consequences for political
society, not merely for the individual. Central to a healthy democratic polity is

393. Zenon Bankowski & James MacLean, Introduction, in THE UNIVERSAL AND THE
PARTICULAR IN LEGAL REASONING, supra note 384, xi, xii.
394. See id. at xii.
395. See id.
396. See id.
397. Id.
398. See Bankowski, supra note 384, at 31 (relying on the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein).
399. See, e.g., MISHNA SANHEDRIN 4:5 (“Therefore was a single man [Adam] only created to teach
you that if anyone destroys a single soul from the children of man, Scripture charges him as though he
had destroyed a whole world.”); see also ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE GENESIS OF JUSTICE: TEN STORIES
OF BIBLICAL INJUSTICE THAT LED TO THE TEN COMMANDMENTS AND MODERN LAW 55 (2000)
(“Even the cost of one killing is incalculable.”).
400. See Bankowski, supra note 384, at 31.
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the existence and communication of diverse views.401 The energetic exchange of
such views aids in avoiding error; helps to “create” a public or common good
concerning principles of political morality; and encourages a republican citizen
character of dissent.402 A culture of conformity, in this view, is the antithesis
ofthe death ofdemocracy.403
Once again, John Stuart Mill saw the point, emphasizing the need to “enable
resistance to the public demand for uniformity.”404 “Without such resistance,” he
declared, “society will be peopled by creatures of ‘weak feelings’ and ‘weak
energies.’”405 Such weaknesses, he explained, would render persons
“dependents” or “subjects” rather than independent citizens.406 Dependency on
government, in Mill’s view, was inconsistent with the British character. “[I]t
was,” he said, “men of another stamp that made England what it has been.”407
Accordingly, he concluded, “men of another stamp will be needed to prevent its
decline.”408
Variants of Mill’s arguments have been warmly embraced by many
academics and at times by courts in the First Amendment free-speech context.409
But Fourth and First Amendment values and principles are intimately linked.410
As noted earlier, without privacy and freedom of movement, individual (and
group) uniqueness cannot thrive.411 Likewise, property is necessary to protect
and enable privacy and free movement (if all were homeless, none would have
privacy; if none had cars or bicycles, few could travel far).412 Such diversity of
character and ideas is essential to diversity of expressed viewpoints.413 Fourth
Amendment interests are a prerequisite to healthy free speech.

401. See KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES
36 (1995).
402. See Taslitz, Democratic Deliberation, supra note 188, at 284 (discussing error-correction and
accountability); see also Andrew E. Taslitz, The Jury and the Common Good: Fusing the Insights of
Modernism and Postmodernism, in FOR THE COMMON GOOD: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF LAW
AND SOCIAL NORMS 32527 (Robin Miller ed., 2004) [hereinafter COMMON GOOD] (discussing
republican theories of “creating” a common good by conversation versus liberal ones of “discovering”
that common good); Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 298, at 76577 (discussing the kind of citizen
character required in a sound American conception of a “republic”).
403. See infra text accompanying notes 40406.
404. See Rubenfeld, supra note 240, at 216 (describing Mill’s theory).
405. MILL, supra note 309, at 125.
406. Id. at 126.
407. Id. at 216.
408. Id.
409. See GREENAWALT, supra note 401, at 36 (describing Mill as one of the few originators of a
school of free-speech thought now widely embraced by scholars and judges).
410. See TASLITZ, supra note 4, at 22, 71, 89, 147, 167, 190, 20307, 22629, 246, 248, 257, 287 nn.20,
23, 302 n.3, 287 n.23.
411. See supra text accompanying notes 293332.
412. See, e.g., TASLITZ, supra note 4, at 20725.
413. See generally Daniel Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
112 (2007) (arguing for a close connection between Fourth Amendment privacy and First Amendment
free speech).
OF SPEECH
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Totalitarian societies understand this speech–privacy connection all too
well. Taming a people requires instilling the fear in them that all they do and
say can be seen and heard. It is no accident that George Orwell’s dystopian
novel, 1984, concerned a world in which “thought police” had access to every
person’s home, job, and telephone.414 More recently, author Margaret Atwood,
in her novel, The Handmaid’s Tale, conjures up a vision of religious
totalitarianism enforced by the virtual absence of privacy for subjugated
persons.415 So pervasively does this contribute to conformity that many of the
oppressed not only behave as expected but think as expected, losing the capacity
to be different.416 Mill himself feared exactly this metaphorical eye. “In our own
times, from the highest class . . . down to the lowest,” said Mill, “everyone lives
as under the eye of a dreaded and hostile censorship.”417 That eye and its
judgment penetrate everywhere, “leav[ing] fewer means of escape, penetrating
much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself.”418
In the post-World War II period, American judges themselves saw clearly
the spectre of totalitarianism that arose from deprivation of privacy, property,
and locomotive rights.419 In the wake of Hitler’s Germany, the mere risk of the
state’s invading these rights worried many in the judiciary. What might
seemingly start small, as had Nazism, could, if replicated often enough,
metastasize into ever-expansive censorship and oppression.
The unmistakable influence of fears of totalitarianism appeared in various
Justices’ opinions with regularity throughout the postwar period.420 In Johnson
v. United States,421 for example, Justice Jackson stressed the centrality of the
warrant requirement, worrying that “[a]ny other rule would undermine ‘the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ and
would obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions between our form of
government, where officers are under the law, and the police-state where they
are the law.”422 Justice Frankfurter expressed a similar sentiment, arguing in
Wolf v. Colorado423 that if the Fourth Amendment, originally applicable only to
the federal government, were not read as being incorporated against the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment, Americans would need to fear the “knock at
the door, whether by day or by night, as a prelude to search, without authority,
but solely on the authority of the police.”424 Totalitarian comparisons were most

414. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1950).
415. See MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE (2006).
416. See id.
417. See MILL, supra note 309, at 21.
418. Id. at 13.
419. See generally Margaret Raymond, Rejecting Totalitarianism: Translating the Guarantees of
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1193 (1998).
420. See id.
421. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
422. Id. at 17.
423. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
424. Id. at 2728.
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passionately used in dissents, expressly decrying majorities’ positions as
ignoring the importance of “avoiding the dangers of a police state.”425
Appellate-court dissenters like Jerome Frank also went so far as to condemn
monitoring radio transmitters because that was reminiscent of Hitler’s secret
police and Orwell’s 1984.426 Perhaps the most memorable quote from the
Supreme Court’s dissenters, however, was this one, again by Justice Jackson:
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the
spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart [as unfettered search and
seizure]. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective
weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to
have dwelt and worked among a people possessed of many admirable qualities but
deprived of these rights to know that the human personality deteriorates and dignity
and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any
427
hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police.

Later, the villain switched from Nazism to Communism, particularly Sovietstyle communism.428 Yet the message remained the same, and faint echoes of it
appear in more-recent opinions.429 Professor Margaret Raymond has traced in
detail the rise and fall of antitotalitarian rhetoric; she embraces the wisdom of
such rhetoric as essential if the risk of tyranny that prompted the Founders to
craft the Fourth Amendment is not to become seen as but a historical oddity—
no danger worthy of real concern in contemporary society.430 The Justices most
loudly warning against modern tyranny understood, says Raymond, that
“particular police practices, if permitted, will open the door to
totalitarianism . . . .”431 Losing the passion that antitotalitarian rhetoric invoked,
Raymond wisely warned, reduces any appeal to an ugly twentieth-century past
as a mere “rote recitation, part of a list of distant outrages,”432 ones which the
“speaker no longer recalls and can no longer express with the fervor that
characterizes the true believer.”433 The risk is therefore run that these appeals,
and the Fourth Amendment itself, will become “mere words,” sound without
fury.
Jed Rubenfeld embraces a similar approach to the Fourth Amendment.
Analogizing to Immanuel Kant’s idea of determining moral imperatives by
exploring their significance if generalized, Rubenfeld asks judges to take into
account the effect that their constitutional search and seizure decisions will have

425. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 171 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also
Raymond, supra note 419, at 1205, 1227.
426. See United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 309, 317 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank J., dissenting), aff’d
343 U.S. 747 (1952).
427. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 18081 (1949).
428. See Raymond, supra note 419, at 1210.
429. See id. at 121013.
430. See id. at 124463.
431. Id. at 1262.
432. Id. at 1263.
433. Id.
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if their implicit or explicit principles are made widespread.434 Rubenfeld does
not ask what would happen if the principles were made universal, but only what
would happen if they were “implemented on a scale broad enough to become
part of common people’s knowledge and everyday life.”435 What matters is not
whether the principle has been so implemented, but whether its consequences
raise the risk of fostering, in even a small way, a totalitarian culture.436 For
example, current doctrine finds no “privacy” violation in allowing undercover
police agents to gain entry to intimate relationships, political groups, and
homes.437 However, argues Rubenfeld, if generalized from the tactic’s being used
against drug dealers or suspected terrorists to everyone in all contexts, the
result would be a conformist society of fear filled with weak citizens unable to
trust family, friends, employers, or even spiritual advisors.438 That thought
experiment suggests to Rubenfeld not a flat ban on undercover agents, but at
least some measure of constitutional regulation.439
Rubenfeld roots his argument in taking seriously the Fourth Amendment’s
declaration that it protects a right of “the People” to be “secure.”440 Insecurity,
to Rubenfeld, results in the fear generated by significant risks of invasions of
personal life.441 A single decision may alone validate state invasion of privacy,
locomotive, or property rights for a relatively small class of persons or, even
more narrowly, only for the parties then before the court. However, if the
principle the case creates is not explicitly cabined, there is no logical limit to its
growth.442 Freedom may erode slowly rather than in a rush, but it will just as

434. See Rubenfeld, supra note 240, at 22024; IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 37 (Allen W. Wood ed. & trans., 2002) (1785) (“Act only in accordance
with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”).
435. See Rubenfeld, supra note 240, at 222.
436. See id. at 22224.
437. See id. For a summary of the Fourth Amendment law on undercover agents, see TASLITZ,
PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 11820, 196200, 22124.
438. See Rubenfeld, supra note 240, at 223. Rubenfeld remarks,
Were covert informants and police agents to become ubiquitous, a great deal more than a loss
of privacy would ensue. The true loss would be born by everyone, including those who were
never spied on (therefore suffering no actual governmental invasion of their privacy) and
those who stopped saying anything personal to anyone else (therefore never suffering an
exposure of anything private). A society with ubiquitous undercover agents is a secret police
state. It is a state that deliberately seeks to destroy the security that people enjoy in their
personal lives—the confidence that what ones does in personal life belongs to personal life
and will not generally be known to public authorities.
Id.
439. See id. at 22324.
440. See id. at 20910.
441. See id. at 21118.
442. See id. at 22024.
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surely wither away if the state seems to have the power to wound it, even if it
has not yet chosen to do so fully.443
This insecurity is a harm to the People, not merely to individuals, precisely
because it threatens the nature of the political society that the Fourth
Amendment aspires for America to become.444 The collectivity as a whole, not
merely its parts, suffers.445
The individualized-suspicion requirement plays an important role in this
antitotalitarian political culture. By putting up a significant obstacle to invading
personal life, it creates an important, albeit not impassable, roadblock to the
too-ready state erosion of privacy, property, and free movement.446 Moreover, it
does so by showing respect for individual uniqueness and diversity, the very
supports necessary to a diverse, open society of strong-willed citizen voices.
These political ramifications matter as much to preserving the individualizedsuspicion ideal as do the harms likely to be done to individual persons and
groups by the ideal’s demise.
IV
IMPLICATIONS
An awareness of the benefits of the individualized-suspicion requirement
make apparent the simple point that such awareness has practical significance
as well as theoretical importance. First, the individualized-suspicion
requirement should not be tossed overboard in favor of a generalization unless
the generalization is at least a nonspurious one; second, if there is a good reason
to jettison the requirement, every effort should be made to find alternative
means for attaining the benefits that would have obtained had the requirement
not been compromised.
That despite its benefits, it sometimes makes sense to modify or eliminate
the individualized-suspicion requirement assumes, of course, that the
requirement comes with costs—the flipside of the benefits of that requirement.
Indeed, there are a variety of such costs. Articulation of these costs, though
often not all in one location, is, unlike articulation of the benefits, so ubiquitous
in much modern scholarship and case law that little citation is necessary.
Plowing this garden tills familiar soil.447
443. Cf. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003)
(exploring the circumstances under which the cumulation of small incursions on rights can lead to a
slippery slope in which rights slowly but ultimately substantially erode or die).
444. See id. at 21018; TASLITZ, supra note 4, at 3, 4, 44, 5561, 65, 67, 7071, 7683, 89, 177
(discussing the importance of “peoplehood” to understanding the Fourth Amendment).
445. See Rubenfeld, supra note 240, at 21018; TASLITZ, supra note 4, at 26063.
446. See supra text accompanying notes 31130.
447. See, e.g., Kevin Robert Glandon, Bright Lines on the Road: The Fourth Amendment, the
Automatic Companion Rule, the “Automatic Container” Rule, and a New Rule for Drug-or-FirearmRelated Traffic Stop Companion Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1267,
129899 (2009) (arguing for elimination of any individualized-suspicion requirement for certain drugor firearm-related traffic stops). But see Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in
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A. The Costs of Individualized Suspicion
Requiring individualized suspicion imposes eight potential primary costs.
First, precisely because acquiring such suspicion can sometimes be difficult,
fewer searches and seizures will occur. But that may mean that more guilty
persons escape justice.448 Of course, the mere existence of the Fourth
Amendment necessarily reduces crime-detection effectiveness. If police could
break into homes, arrest persons willy-nilly, hold them for long periods of
interrogation, all without any need to justify these police actions, doubtless
more crime would be discovered and punished. But many more innocent
persons would be swept up as well. Still, the costs cannot be ignored, and, in
theory, if these costs become sufficiently high, crime could rise to a point at
which social stability is threatened, prompting a harsh backlash against robust
civil-liberties protections.
Second, and relatedly, if a high enough number of criminals escape justice,
specific and general deterrence will falter.449 Unpunished criminals see no reason
not to offend again, and previously law-abiding persons seeing little chance of
harsh consequences from wrongdoing may in the future turn to crimes from
which they might otherwise have desisted.450
Third, in some instances, the time needed for investigation to establish
individualized suspicion can have grave consequences. Specifically, as when
terrorism is involved, enormous imminent harm can be avoided only by prompt
action unsupported by individualized suspicion. In the perhaps-fanciful, tickingnuclear-time-bomb scenario,451 police strongly suspect that a nuclear weapon
will wipe New York City from the map within an hour. Yet, lacking
individualized suspicion, they let millions of Americans die. Real-world
scenarios are likely to leave much less at stake, with whether harm is
“imminent” being an open question. Nevertheless, all that humans can fairly be
expected to do is to make their best judgments in an uncertain world. Even if
the harm raised and the certainty of its occurrence are much lessperhaps a
threat by kidnappers to kill a single child if ransom is not delivered within an

Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U . MEM. L. REV. 483 (1995) (arguing that
the state should bear a heavy burden when seeking to depart from the individualized-suspicion
mandate). My approach differs from Clancy’s in that I focus on the policy reasons justifying
presumptive individualized suspicion, while he focuses on the historical justifications, thus making our
visions distinct but complementary. I also explore here in detail the meaning of suspicion’s being
“individualized,” a task Clancy does not undertake.
448. This argument—that a reduced number of searches and seizures means freeing the guilty—is
but another way of saying that the individualized-suspicion requirement unduly burdens law
enforcement. See, e.g., Glandon, supra note 447 (analyzing such a burden in certain types of traffic
stops).
449. See ELLEN PODGOR, PETER J. HENNING & ANDREW E. TASLITZ, CRIMINAL LAW: CONCEPTS
AND PRACTICE 47 (2009) (summarizing the purposes of the criminal law, including the types of
deterrence).
450. See supra sources cited notes 44747.
451. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION: A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS 128 (2006).
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hourthe consequences of delay can involve substantial human pain that
cannot be ignored. Civil liberties have their price.
Fourth, unbending application of an individualized-suspicion requirement
can dramatically raise the costs of meeting it. For example, police may find
themselves with inadequate evidence of probable cause to search a home. They
may, however, have some reason to believe that a suspect’s cell phone, which he
sometimes leaves unguarded on his desk, contains evidence sufficient to give
the police the probable cause they are lacking.452 If an individualized-suspicion
requirement bars searching the cell phone, police may never catch the bad guy.
On the other hand, if they are free surreptitiously to read his cell phone when it
is unguarded, that may give them individualized suspicion sufficient to obtain a
search warrant for his home. The choice is therefore not necessarily between
individualized suspicion and nothing. Rather, the breadth of the mandate can
be varied, sometimes requiring individualized suspicion, sometimes not. An
unbending obsession with such suspicion may, therefore, impose significant
social costs that a more flexible scheme might reduce.
Fifth, individualized-suspicion mandates impose significant out-of-pocket
and opportunity costs. Police must do more investigation.453 Sometimes this
investigation may be modest, perhaps standing on a street corner unobtrusively
observing a suspect a few minutes longer. But, other times, the expense in time
and money can be far greater, including such things as extended stakeouts,
undercover work, covert fingerprinting, DNA testing, and a host of other
activities.454 Moreover, every extra minute that police spend investigating one
case that may or may not pan out is a minute subtracted from another potential
case or from such crime-preventative activities as building community trust via
neighborhood meetings and other community-policing efforts.
Sixth, individualized suspicion may for all practical purposes be impossible
to attain in certain settings, at least at a tolerable cost. For example, inspecting
homes for fire-code violations would be virtually impossible if such inspections
could be done based only upon probable cause.455 Yet even one resulting serious
fire risks spreading, perhaps sacrificing, an entire neighborhood.
Seventh, a too-robust and widespread individualized-suspicion mandate may
itself harm the law’s legitimacy. If the state cannot protect its citizens’
safetyone of the central American ideological justifications for having a
statethen how can citizens be expected to accept and defer to state actions in
that and other areas?

452. Cf. SCHAUER, supra note 65, at 99238 (discussing a cell-phone analogy that prompted this
example).
453. See Taslitz, supra note 190.
454. See generally ROBERT JACKALL, STREET STORIES: THE WORLD OF POLICE DETECTIVES
(2005) (describing detectives’ investigative techniques in their own words).
455. Cf. TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 40203 (discussing fire-marshal “warrants”
not based on traditional probable cause).
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Eighth, judges fearing just these sorts of costs may dramatically limit the
scope of Fourth Amendment protections. They can do so by narrowly defining
what constitutes a “search” or a “seizure”thus narrowing when the Fourth
Amendment even applies in the first placeor by diluting those protections
that do apply, for example, finding individualized suspicion based upon weak
evidence of questionable trustworthiness.
B. Illustrations
1. The Case of the Spurious Generalization
If generalizations are to be used in place of individualized suspicion, all
agree that the generalizations should not be spurious ones.456 Yet a majority of
the Supreme Court has shown little interest in seriously examining this
question, either ignoring it or simply assuming the generalizations’ nonspurious
nature.
In Illinois v. Wardlow,457 the Court held that unprovoked flight from the
police is sufficient to establish particularized reasonable suspicion in a highcrime, but not in a low-crime, area. The majority considered such flight
“suggestive” of wrongdoing without clearly explaining why.458 Its implicit logic
seems to be this: a high-crime area by definition contains a higher percentage of
criminals than does a low-crime area. Furthermore, unprovoked
flight“wherever it occursis the consummate act of evasion . . . .”459 The
Court conceded, however, that there may be other, innocent reasons for such
flight, and that flight itself is not an illegal activity.460 Nevertheless, the majority
concluded that “Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent
people.”461 Apparently, the Court saw that risk as acceptable in a high-crime
area because the higher chance of catching the guilty there means both that
fewer innocent persons will be caught in the law’s web, and that the
probabilities of a significant payoff, namely catching a guilty offender, were
worth the “minimal intrusion” costs of a Terry stop.462
The Court based its analysis of a fair reading of flight’s meaning in the
particular location on its own intuition. The Court expressly rejected its
competence to do otherwise, declaring that the judiciary does “not have
available empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious
behavior, and . . . cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty from judges or
law enforcement officers where none exists.”463 Accordingly, the determination

456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.

See supra text accompanying notes 109–35.
528 U.S. 119 (2000).
See id. at 124.
Id.
See id. at 125.
Id. at 126; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126.
Id. at 12425.
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of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and
inferences about human behavior.464
But commonsense judgments can fall short, and “scientific certainty,”
whatever the Court means by that phrase, is not necessary. Ample quality social
science was available, in a way easily accessible to lawyers, calling into question
the accuracy of the Court’s generalization that flight from police in a high-crime
area was indicative of consciousness of guilt. Indeed, Justice Stevens, in an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer,465 relied on just such social-science evidenceevidence to
which the majority offered no response.
Justice Stevens reviewed that social science in six separate footnotes, some
of them lengthy. These footnotes reviewed, among other matters, the high
percentages of African Americans who consider police harassment a serious
problem in their own community; the belief by many minorities that field
interrogations are conducted in an abusive manner; the high percentages of
minority stop-and-frisks that do not result in an arrest; the disproportionate
percentage of minority street stops in many major cities; the belief by even
substantial percentages of police in at least one major city that its department’s
officers exhibit racial bias; the New Jersey Attorney General’s conclusion that
racial profiling by troopers on the state’s highways was real, not imagined; and
the Massachusetts Attorney General’s conclusion that Terry stop-and-frisks
were done in a particularly demeaning mannerfor example, public strip
searcheswhen aimed at minorities.466 This ample data, explained Stevens,
meant that for some citizens, “particularly minorities and those residing in highcrime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely
innocent, but, with or without justification, believes that contact with the police
can itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated with the
officer’s sudden presence.”467 Stevens concluded, “For such a person,
unprovoked flight is neither ‘aberrant’ nor ‘abnormal.’”468 Given officers’ own
recognition of the problem and support from law-enforcement agencies’
internal investigations of their own practices, Stevens considered “the
reasonableness of these beliefs . . . too pervasive to be dismissed as random or
rare, and too persuasive to be disparaged as inconclusive or insufficient.”469 The
data was, in short, sufficient to support a “commonsense conclusion” that
unprovoked flight can occur for innocent reasons.470
Stevens also relied on other social science, case law, and the Bible to
buttress the argument that innocent persons may flee from the police, apart

464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.

Id. at 125.
See id. at 126 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 13235 & nn.1011.
Id. at 132.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 13233 (2000).
Id. at 13334.
Id.
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from the location where a stop occurs, for a wealth of innocent reasons: the
belief that police presence suggests physical danger from criminals themselves
or from an impending police–criminal confrontation, the fear of humiliation by
being wrongly associated with a criminal act, or the annoyance or expense of
explaining or defending themselves.471 Stevens conceded that flight can also be
consistent with consciousness of guilt of crime.472 He intended, though, not to
banish flight from consideration but rather to make two major points: First,
given that flight could support entirely opposite inferencesinnocence or
guiltthe burden must be on the state to justify the latter inference as the more
sensible one; and, second, that a per se rulea generalization about high-crime
neighborhoods and flight’s meaning therecould not be justified as a departure
from the constitutionally preferable course that the original Terry opinion
directed—a case-specific assessment of individualized suspicion based upon a
thorough analysis of the totality of the circumstances.473 As Stevens put it,
Given the diversity and frequency of possible motivations for flight, it would be
profoundly unwise to endorse either per se rule [that flight in a high-crime
neighborhood establishes reasonable suspicion alone or that it never matters]. The
inference we can reasonably draw about the motivation for a person’s flight, rather,
will depend on a number of circumstances. Factors such as the time of day, the
number of people in the area, the character of the neighborhood, whether the officer
was in uniform, the way the runner was dressed, the direction and speed of the flight,
and whether the person’s behavior was otherwise unusual might be relevant in specific
cases. This number of variables is surely sufficient to preclude either a bright-line rule
that always justifies, or that never justifies, an investigative stop based on the sole fact
474
that flight began after a police officer appeared nearby.

But, concluded Stevens, the record was far too vague, filled with stunning
gaps and surprising lapses of officer memory, for the state to meet its burden of
meeting Stevens’ totality-of-the-circumstances test for particularized
suspicion.475 Furthermore, even were a generalization to be made based upon
the extent of crime occurring in the neighborhood, the better-supported
generalization would be quite the opposite of that urged by the state and
accepted by the Court:
The State, along with a majority of the Court, relies as well on the assumption that this
flight occurred in a high crime area. Even if that assumption is accurate, it is
insufficient because even in a high crime neighborhood unprovoked flight does not
invariably lead to reasonable suspicion. On the contrary, because many factors
providing innocent motivations for unprovoked flight are concentrated in high crime
areas, the character of the neighborhood arguably makes an inference of guilt less
appropriate, rather than more so. Like unprovoked flight itself, presence in a high
crime neighborhood is a fact too generic and susceptible to innocent explanations to
476
satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry.

471. See id. at 13034 & nn.56; Proverbs 22:3 (King James) (“A shrewd man sees trouble coming
and lies low; the simple walk into it and pay the penalty.”).
472. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 129 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
473. See id. at 12930 & n.4; see also id. at 140.
474. Id. at 12930.
475. See id. at 13740.
476. Id. at 139.
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Schauer himself supports using only nonspurious generalizations, and ones
on which the state, not the suspect, bears the burden of persuasion.477 Stevens’
view, not the majority’s in Wardlow, is thus the sounder one, even for readers
accepting the frequent wisdom of relying on generalities. For those who, like
myself, are far more skeptical of such reliance, Stevens’ embrace of case-specific
particularity is wiser still.
2. Minimizing Generalization’s Harm
The Court has long embraced an “assumption of risk” doctrine, also often
called the “third-party doctrine,”478 which generally renders police’s obtaining
information that had been voluntarily shared by an individual with a third party
devoid of a reasonable expectation of privacy.479 The practical effect of this
doctrine is to free such police conduct from constitutional regulation under the
Fourth Amendment.480
The American Bar Association (ABA) recently appointed a task force to
draft standards regulating government access to third-party records in criminal
investigations.481 That appointment necessarily reflects a judgment that the
third-party doctrine is, as a matter of policy, unwise.482 Yet the task force’s draft
standards recognize that regulating such access does not necessarily mean
barring it, or even imposing probable cause as a routine obstacle to access.
Rather, the task force’s draft standards create four categories of third-party
records. Those categories are “highly protected,” “moderately protected,”
“minimally protected,” or “unprotected.”483 The category into which a record
falls is based on weighing a variety of factors, including the extent to which the
initial information transfer is “reasonably necessary to participate meaningfully
in society or is socially beneficial, including free and robust expression”; the
“extent to which the information is personal,” meaning intimate or likely to
cause stigma or embarrassment if disclosed, or “typically disclosed only within
one’s close social network”; the extent to which the public is aware of the
information’s accessibility by those outside the third-party entity; and the extent
to which the law already restricts accessing or disseminating the information,
including by government.484 Note that these concerns address several, though by
no means all, of the justifications for having a sturdy individualized-suspicion

477. See supra text accompanying notes 10935.
478. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 116–21; Orin Kerr, The Case for the ThirdParty Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009).
479. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Government Access to Private Records, Draft Version
5.0 8–10 (2009).
480. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 35, at 116–21.
481. See ABA Standards, supra note 479, at 1–8.
482. See id. at 8–10.
483. See id. at 11–16, 1920.
484. See id.
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requirement, particularly the benefits of privacy in promoting free expression,
intimacy, and freedom from stigma.485
Absent consent or exigency, the standards vary the degree of justification
required for government access to individuals’ information held by third-party
entities based upon the category of record involved.486 A warrant based upon
probable cause is required for highly protected information; a court order based
upon reasonable suspicion to believe that the information in the record is
relevant to an investigation is required for moderately protected information
(such as financial transactions and balances); a judicial subpoena based upon a
judicial determination of a “reasonable possibility” that a record contains
information relevant to an investigation is required for minimally protected
information (such as utility bills); but unprotected information relevant to an
investigation requires no more than an officer’s mere request based upon the
officer’s own belief in a reasonable possibility that the record contains such
information.487
This sliding scale seeks to accommodate the individual and social interests in
protecting the information against legitimate law-enforcement needs. The task
force thus concluded that, at least under some circumstances, imposing meaty
individualized-suspicion requirements would unduly hamper law enforcement
for relatively little social gain.488 At the same time, the standards recognize that
diluted individualized suspicion (reasonable suspicion via a court order) is often
preferable to none and that, when that is not so, at least relevancy requirements
determined by neutral, independent third parties (the judiciary) are preferable
to unguided officer discretion. Retaining judicial involvement, requiring
advance justifications, and requiring at least some articulable basis for action
retains many of the benefits of the strongest individualized-suspicion
requirement (probable cause) while reducing its costs.489
But the standards go further, requiring, for example, notice to various
persons affected, including for some records notice to the “general public”;
imposing auditing, security, integrity, limited access, relatively prompt
destruction, and accuracy requirements on government retention and use of
seized records or information contained therein; and imposing accountability
requirements.490 Accountability mechanisms include administrative sanctions
pursuant to specifically drafted rules, civil liability, criminal liability for serious
violations, periodic review, and periodic public reports summarizing searchand-seizure practices. Politically accountable officials are involved in many of
the proposed standards’ protective mechanisms.491

485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.

See supra text accompanying notes 210446.
See ABA Standards, supra note 479, at 20.
See id. at 20.
See id. at 116.
See supra part III (detailing social benefits of individualized suspicion).
See ABA Standards, supra note 479, at 2123.
See id. at 17, 19.
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I am not opining on the wisdom of the precise details of the draft, nor do I
plan here to offer and defend specific examples of records that I believe should
fit in one category of justification or another. But I do approve of the draft’s
recognition that sometimes the cost of the most powerful individualizedsuspicion requirement is too high but that departure from it should be reluctant,
gradual, and based upon increasingly pressing need. I also embrace the draft’s
effort, as it dilutes or eliminates individualized-suspicion requirements, to
preserve many of their benefits, including political accountability and voice,
limits on police discretion, fair notice, and efforts to minimize individual
humiliation and the risks of error.492 Concerning political accountability, the
ABA has gone even farther in a related area, video surveillance of the public,
requiring direct citizen participation in periodically monitoring and critiquing
government surveillance operations.493 Of this, too, I strongly approve.
V
CONCLUSION
In this article I have sought to clarify the individualized-suspicion
requirement’s meaning and to develop in some detail several of its most
important major social benefits. At the same time, the article recognizes the
need at times for the state to dilute or jettison the individualized-suspicion
mandate. But, in doing so, the state should be aware of the mandate’s
purposesincluding promoting distributive and procedural fairness; protecting
affected persons’ and the people’s political voice and autonomy; encouraging
police transparency and accountability; protecting privacy, individual
uniqueness and political diversity; preserving narrative integrity and human
dignity; and maintaining the mystery and awe of treating persons as unique and
infinitely valuable individuals. Without mandating individualized suspicion, the
full panoply of its benefits cannot likely be maintained with appropriate vigor.
But every effort should be made to do so.
The ABA’s law-reform efforts described above illustrate how this might be
accomplished. Moreover, when reliance on generalization is required, as Justice
Stevens’ Wardlow dissent demonstrates, the state should bear the burden at
least of proving that the generalization is nonspurious. If both these cautions
are heeded, Fourth Amendment and related statutory law and executive searchand-seizure practices will move toward a fairer, more accurate, and more
legitimate form while better safeguarding public safety.

492. See id. at 23.
493. See TASLITZ, supra note 4, at 5960.

